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Given the recent economic climate, the judiciary faces an all too familiar challenge: navigate
through the web that is bankruptcy and securities fraud. So far, bankruptcy has evolved into a
tool to resolve mass tort litigation, like securities fraud. However, this Article explores bankruptcy
as a tool to resolve securities litigation against non-debtors, those that never file for bankruptcy
protection. The protection the Bankruptcy Code provides to non-debtors, like officers and direc-
tors, goes largely unnoticed, much to the detriment of securities fraud victims. Mindful that we
now are in the midst of another financial crisis and that attention will slowly turn to the courts to
pick up the pieces, this Article explores the significant protection non-debtors obtain from their
debtor-company’s bankruptcy filing and the adverse consequences it has for securities fraud liti-
gants seeking recovery from these non-debtors.
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Given the recent economic climate, the judiciary faces an all too 
familiar challenge: navigate through the web that is bankruptcy and 
securities fraud.  So far, bankruptcy has evolved into a tool to resolve 
mass tort litigation, like securities fraud.  However, this Article 
explores bankruptcy as a tool to resolve securities litigation against 
non-debtors, those that never file for bankruptcy protection.  The 
protection the Bankruptcy Code provides to non-debtors, like 
officers and directors, goes largely unnoticed, much to the detriment 
of securities fraud victims.  Mindful that we now are in the midst of 
another financial crisis and that attention will slowly turn to the 
courts to pick up the pieces, this Article explores the significant 
protection non-debtors obtain from their debtor-company’s 
bankruptcy filing and the adverse consequences it has for securities 
fraud litigants seeking recovery from these non-debtors. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy has evolved into a tool to resolve mass tort litigation, 
like securities fraud.  However, this Article explores bankruptcy’s effect 
on securities litigation against non-debtors, those that never file for 
 
*  Staff Law Clerk for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; J.D. 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law, 2009.  Special thanks to Susan N.K. 
Gummow, of Butler Pappas, L.L.P.; Professor Michael J. Kaufman, Academic Dean of 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law; Kevin LaCroix, author of the D&O Diary, 
(www.dandodiary.com); and Professor Chunlin Leonhard, of Loyola University of New 
Orleans College of Law. 
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bankruptcy protection.  The protection the Bankruptcy Code (“the 
Code”) provides non-debtors, like officers and directors, goes largely 
unnoticed, much to the detriment of securities fraud victims.  Mindful 
that the recent economic climate will force the judiciary to navigate the 
web that is bankruptcy and securities fraud,1
This Article first discusses the general concept of investor recovery 
under the securities laws and the Code.
 this Article explores the 
significant protection non-debtors obtain from their debtor-company’s 
bankruptcy filing and the adverse consequences it has for securities 
fraud litigants seeking recovery from these non-debtors. 
2  Next, it explores bankruptcy’s 
implications for securities fraud suits against non-debtors.3  The Article 
discusses how the automatic stay is used to protect directors and officers 
from securities litigation and affect a de facto release from liability.4  It 
shows that a company’s bankruptcy can impose duplicative discovery 
costs on plaintiff-investors and even influence the certification of a class 
action outside of bankruptcy against non-debtors.5  Furthermore, the 
Article demonstrates that in a company’s bankruptcy, the bankruptcy 
court can release non-debtors from liability outright.6  It then argues that 
the Code’s proposed remedy for investor-fraud, the bankruptcy trustee, 
is inadequate.7
 
  The trustee likely lacks standing to sue on behalf of 
plaintiff-investors, and may be barred from recovering applicable 
insurance proceeds.  The Article concludes that bankruptcy’s unnoticed 
protection for non-debtors from securities fraud impedes investor 
recovery for fraud.  
II. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 
Both bankruptcy and private securities fraud class actions are 
collective devices that pool the congruent interests of multiple claimants 
 
 1.  Richard D. Cudahy, What Use is the Judiciary in a Financial Crisis? 41 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. iii, x (2010). 
 2.  See infra Part II (discussing investor-recovery under the Code, private rights of 
action for securities fraud, and bankruptcy’s protection for corporate defendants from 
securities litigation). 
 3.  See infra Part III.A.-D. 
 4.  See infra Part III.B. (showing that directors and officers often seek to extend the 
automatic stay under the Code with arguments resting on faulty premises). 
 5.  See infra Part III.C. 
 6.  See infra Part III.D. 
 7.  See infra Part IV.A-B. 
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to a single fund.8  Apart from this common design, bankruptcy petitions 
and securities fraud allegations often go hand-in-hand as economic 
downturn causes corporations to miss earnings expectations or default 
on debt, fueling both securities litigation and bankruptcy.9  Filing rates 
for business bankruptcies and securities lawsuits between 2007 and 2009 
evidence this correlation.  Business bankruptcies increased dramatically 
as a result of the financial market turmoil caused by the subprime 
mortgage crisis in 2008 and 2009.10  According to the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts, at the end of September 2009, 
business bankruptcies increased by fifty-two percent from a year 
earlier.11  Securities litigation likewise spiked.12
 
 8.  See In re Computer Learning Ctrs. Inc., 344 B.R. 79, 92 n.19 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
2006) (observing that the advantage of proceeding by a class action—aggregating 
claims and determining liability for an entire class in a single trial—can be achieved in 
bankruptcy as well). 
  Interestingly, many of 
 9.  Kevin LaCroix, Corporate Defaults, Bankruptcies, and D&O Claims, IV 
INSIGHTS, 4 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.oakbridgeins.com/newsletter.htm; 
Cudahy, supra note 1, at x (“[B]ankruptcy is frequently followed by corporate fraud 
charges and it is an old story how this can be triggered by public indignation driven by 
widespread financial losses.”). History bares out this correlation as well, as agitation for 
bankruptcy legislation arose during the depression in 1793, the financial crisis and 
controversy over the Bank of the United States in the 1820s, the Panic of 1837, and the 
Panic of 1857.  DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION, A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY 
LAW IN AMERICA, 25 (2001).  Professor Roberta Romano similarly observes that “the 
Enron scandal was followed by revelations of accounting fraud and insider self-dealing 
at several large corporations, nearly all of which were thereafter pushed into 
bankruptcy: Adelphia Communications, Global Crossing, Tyco International, and 
WorldCom.” Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521, 1545 (2005). 
 10.  John Hartgen, Total Bankruptcy Filings Up 34 Percent, Business Filings Up 61 
Percent in Third Quarter, American Bankruptcy Institute, (Dec. 15, 2008), 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/Conte
ntDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=55930 (last visited on Feb. 5, 2009) 
 11.  Press Release, Admin. Office of the Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Up 34 Percent 
over Last Fiscal Year (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/ 
2009/BankruptcyFilingsSep2009.cfm.  Similarly, between 2007 and 2008, the number 
of bankruptcy filings increased by twenty-eight percent. Press Release, U. S. Bankr. 
Courts, Bankruptcy Cases Commenced and Terminated During the Twelve Month 
Periods ended June 30, 2007 and 2008, http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/ 
2008/bankrupt_newstat_ftable_jun2008.xlswww.uscourts.gov/bnkrptcystats/bankruptcy
stats.htm.  As of February 2009, bankruptcy filings were up thirty-seven percent from a 
year earlier.   Bill Rochelle & Bob Willis, U.S. Bankruptcy Filings Surged 37% in 
February Over Prior Year (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.bankruptcy-statistics.com.  “All 
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the companies that file bankruptcy are named in securities fraud suits 
(seventy-seven percent of the large public companies that filed for 
bankruptcy between 2007 and 2008).13
A. INVESTOR RECOVERY UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
  This Part explores the Code’s 
effect on investor recovery, private rights of action for securities fraud, 
and how a company is protected in bankruptcy from securities litigation. 
The Code governs how persons and companies go out of business 
or recover from debt.  The Code gives the honest, but unfortunate, 
debtor a “financial fresh start.”14  The bankruptcy discharge 
accomplishes this goal by releasing debtors from personal liability from 
specific debts and prohibiting creditors from taking action against the 
debtor to collect those debts.15  Upon discharge, the debtor is no longer 
liable for any debt incurred before the bankruptcy petition.16
1. Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Liquidation   
  The nature 
and scope of a debtor’s discharge depends on the chapter of the Code 
under which the debtor files.  The Code affords two types of relief: 
liquidation under Chapter 7 and reorganization under either Chapter 11 
or 13. 
Chapter 7 is used to liquidate the debtor’s assets and distribute the 
property to the debtor’s creditors.17
 
but twelve states had double-digit increases in filings in February from the prior 
month.”  Id. 
  In Chapter 7, a bankruptcy court 
 12.  Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2009: A Year in Review, 
at 3 (2009), available at, http://www.cornerstone.com/files/News/02dc60a4-d89f 
-4e99-82cf-cb19742db676/Presentation/NewsAttachment/364f486f-9f92-4354-8002-d2
c9912cdab8/Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2009_YIR.pdf (finding 177 filings in 2007, 
and 223 filings in 2008); Stephanie Plancich & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in 
Securities Class Action Litigation: 2009 Year-End Update, at 2 (2009), available at, 
http://www.nera.com/publication.asp?p_ID=4015 (finding 195 filings in 2007, and 253 
in 2008). 
 13.  LaCroix, supra note 9, at 3 (citing the Advisen Report analyzing securities fraud 
lawsuits and bankruptcies).  Both the largest bankruptcies and biggest corporate 
scandals in the past ten years occurred simultaneously, including WorldCom, Enron, 
and Adelphia Communications.  Bankruptcydata.com. 
 14.  E.g., Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
 15.  E.g., Cent. Virginia Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363-64 (2006). 
 16.  11 U.S.C. §§  727(c)(1), 1141, 1328. 
 17.  E.g., Boston & Maine Corp. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 587 F.3d 89, 99-100 
2011] BANKRUPTCY’S PROTECTION FOR NON-DEBTORS 379 
FROM SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION 
 
grants a discharge after the termination of the period for filing objections 
to the discharge by the trustee and the debtor’s creditors.18  Typically, 
Chapter 7 cases are “no asset” cases and are used by persons.19  In 
Chapter 7, debts as a result of securities fraud, i.e., judgments or 
settlements, cannot be discharged.20
A company may also file under Chapter 7, although this is rare; 
when it does so, it stops all operations, liquidates any assets, and goes 
out of business.2
 
1  The recovery of such a company’s investors depends 
on the ordering system (or “rules of priority”) in the Code.22  Investors 
who take the least risk—by extending credit backed by collateral, such 
as a mortgage—are paid first.23  Bondholders likely recover more than 
shareholders; bonds represent the debt of the company, and the company 
has agreed to pay bondholders interest and return their principal.24  
Shareholders take the greatest risk owning the company’s profits and 
losses,25 so they are last in line for repayment if the company fails.26
2. Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 Reorganization  
 
Chapters 11 and 13 “reorganize” the debtor and provide for a 
payment plan for creditors.  Chapter 13, the reorganization process used 
by persons, grants a discharge to a debtor upon the completion of the 
 
(1st Cir. 2009); In re M & S Grading, Inc., 526 F.3d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 18.  11 U.S.C. §  727(c)(1); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004. 
 19.  Ed Flynn, et al., Chapter 7 Asset Cases, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 22 (2003) 
(“During the year ended June 30, 2002, there were 1,026,901 chapter 7 cases closed 
nationwide.  About 96 percent of chapter 7 cases are closed without any funds collected 
and distributed to creditors by the assigned trustee.”). 
 20.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). 
 21.  See, e.g., Carpenters Health & Welfare Trust Funds for Cal. v. Roberston (In re 
Rufener Constr., Inc.), 53 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 22.  11 U.S.C. § 727. 
 23.  Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Bankruptcy Basics: What Happens When Public 
Companies Go Bankrupt?  What Every Investor Should Know 69 (2004). 
 24.  U.S Securities and Exchange Commission, What Every Investor Should Know . 
. . Corporate Bankruptcy,  http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/bankrupt.htm (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter What Every Investor Should Know]. 
 25.  “Securities are specialized contracts.  Investors agree to contribute capital and 
bear the risk of the enterprise; in exchange they get promises of a role in running the 
business and a share of the returns.”  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 614 (1985). 
 26.  See 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (subordinating investors to all other claimants). 
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debtor’s plan of reorganization.27  Conversely, a debtor who files under 
Chapter 11 receives a discharge when the plan is merely confirmed, 
rather than completed.28  A corporation often uses Chapter 11 to 
“reorganize” its business to try to become profitable again and continue 
for the sake of its employees and other interested parties.29  In a Chapter 
11 bankruptcy, management continues to run the daily operations, while 
the bankruptcy court must approve all significant decisions.30  The 
debtor files a plan of reorganization (an exclusive right for the first 120 
days31) that provides for the discharge of nonexempt, pre-petition debt.32  
Chapter 11 reorganization departs from the traditional liquidating 
function of bankruptcy.33  In general, under the plan, old shares and 
interests may be exchanged for new shares and interests in the 
reorganized company, which may be fewer in number and worth less.34  
Also under the plan, bondholders may stop receiving interest and 
principal payments, and shareholders may stop receiving dividends.35
 
 27.  11 U.S.C. § 1328. 
  
Bondholders may receive new stock in exchange for their bonds, new 
 28.  11 U.S.C. § 1141. 
 29.  E.g., Boston & Maine Corp. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 587 F.3d 89, 99-100 
(1st Cir. 2009); NMSBPCSLDHB, L.P. v. Integrated Telecom Express, Inc. (In re 
Integrated Telecom Express, Inc.), 384 F.3d 108, 119 (3d Cir. 2004); Cedar Shore 
Resort, Inc. v. Mueller (In re Cedar Shore Resort, Inc.), 235 F.3d 375, 379 (8th Cir. 
2000); Canadian Pac. Forest Prods., Ltd. v. J.D. Irving, Ltd. (In re Gibson Group, Inc.), 
66 F.3d 1436, 1442 (6th Cir. 1995).  This was the case with many airlines throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s.  See Robert M. Hardaway, Of Cabbages and Cabotage: The Case 
for Opening Up the U.S. Airline Industry to International Competition, 34 TRANSP. L.J. 
1, 25 (2007); Mark Mathiesen, Comment, Bankruptcy of Airlines: Causes, Complaints, 
and Changes, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 1017, 1024-25 (1996). 
 30.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)-(c). 
 31.  Id. at § 1121. 
 32.  See id. at § 1141(d); see also United States v. White, 466 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th 
Cir. 2006); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n. v. NRG Energy, Inc., 457 F.3d 
776, 779-80 (8th Cir. 2006); Sequa Corp. v. Christopher (In re Christopher), 28 F.3d 
512, 515 (5th Cir. 1994).   “[E]xempt property is property that a debtor does not have to 
turn over to his creditors if he files for bankruptcy.  Permitting a debtor a few of his 
things, the reasoning goes, will help him make a ‘fresh start’ once his debts have been 
discharged in bankruptcy.”  SKEEL, JR., supra note 9, at 41. 
 33.  Richard E. Mendales, Intensive Care for the Public Corporation: Securities 
Law, Corporate Governance, and the Reorganization Process, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 979, 
982 (2008). 
 34.  What Every Investor Should Know, supra note 24. 
 35.  Id. 
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bonds, or some combination, and shareholders may receive nothing.36
B. PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS 
 
While the Code deals with liquidating and reorganizing a business, 
the securities laws deal with issuing securities when starting a company 
(such as initial public offerings or “IPOs”) and the secondary trading of 
securities in the market.  To ensure the integrity of the American 
marketplace, the securities laws afford private rights of action to victims 
of securities fraud.37  The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the 
need for private enforcement as a supplement to enforcement by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”).38
1. The New Deal and the 1933 and 1934 Acts  
  Several significant securities laws have shaped 
private securities fraud litigation. 
As part of the “New Deal” in response to the Great Depression, 
President Roosevelt promulgated two statutes that changed the 
landscape of securities offerings and trading: the Securities Act of 
193339 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.40
 
 36.  Id. 
  The Securities Act 
 37.  E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 2 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (finding that securities 
regulation protects investors and promotes growth of financial markets); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.),  reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731 
(stating that the purpose of securities laws is to protect investors and maintain 
confidence in the market so national savings and investments may grow for the benefit 
of all). 
 38.  E.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007); 
Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 231 (1988); Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986); J.I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).  Indeed, “[f]ederal prosecutions for serious financial 
crime plummeted as the nation headed toward one of the worst economic meltdowns in 
U.S. history,” and from 2003 to 2009, the number of federal corporate fraud cases 
dropped by 55%, securities fraud charges dropped 17% and bankruptcy fraud cases fell 
by 44%.  Brad Heath, Fraud Prosecutions Fell As Crisis Loomed, USA TODAY (Dec. 
16, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-12-15-prosecute-
fraud_N.htm. 
 39.  15 U.S.C. § 77(a) et. seq. 
 40.  15 U.S.C. § 78 et. seq.  The Great Depression not only spurred securities 
reform, but Bankruptcy reform as well.  The large number of corporate insolvencies 
created pressure to modify the reorganization process.  See Mendales, supra note 33, at 
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of 1933 (the “1933 Act”) sought to provide investors with sufficient, 
material information regarding securities that were offered for sale, and 
to prohibit deceit by the offerees.41  The 1933 Act, which regulates the 
primary offering of securities, contains two anti-fraud measures 
enforceable by private rights of action that threaten issuers and related 
parties into accurate disclosure.42
First, Section 11 allows those that buy securities in an IPO to sue 
IPO “participants” who have made a material misrepresentation (either a 
misstatement or omission) in the stock’s registration statement.4
 
3  A 
“participant” includes the issuer of the securities, its officers and 
directors, the signers of the registration statement, underwriters, and 
other professionals such as accountants, engineers, appraisers, and 
attorneys.44  Under Section 11, plaintiffs may establish liability by 
showing that the registration statement contained a material 
misrepresentation or omission.45  However, defendants (except for the 
issuer) are protected from this draconian form of liability if they proved 




 41.  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). 
 42.  Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288-89 (2d Cir. 1969).  A 
fundamental purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 “was to substitute a philosophy of 
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard 
of business ethics in the securities industry.”  SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
 43.  15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
 44. Michael J. Kaufman, Section 11 of Securities Act of 1933—Material 
Misstatement or Omission in Registration Statements, in § 1:7 EXPERT WITNESSES: 
SECURITIES CASES (2010); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1421 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (auditor liability); Monroe v. Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(accountant liability); In re Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. 
Supp. 1424, 1458 (D. Ariz. 1992) (attorney liability). 
 45.  E.g., In re Constar Int’l Inc. Sec. Litig., 585 F.3d 774, 782-83 (3d Cir. 2009); 
APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Techs., Inc., 476 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007); 
In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005).  Scienter is not required for 
a Section 11 claim.  In re Charles Schwab Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 534, 544 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009). 
 46.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)-(b). “Due diligence” requires the defendants to conduct 
a reasonable investigation which leaves them with no grounds to believe that the parts 
of the registration statement attributed to them contained material misstatements or 
omissions.  15 U.S.C. 77k(b)(3); see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 
375, 381-82 (1983); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
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Second, Section 12 allows the purchasers of securities to sue 
anyone who offers or sells the securities through a prospectus or oral 
communication that contains a material misstatement or omission.47  A 
plaintiff need only prove that the offeror or seller made a material 
misstatement or omission.48  The difference between Section 11 and 
Section 12 is that the former pertains to misrepresentations made in a 
registration statement, while the latter pertains to misrepresentations 
made in a prospectus.49
Also as part of the “New Deal,” Congress passed the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) to regulate the secondary 
trading of securities.5
 
0  The 1934 Act sought to protect investors against 
the manipulation of stock prices by giving investors the right to sue for 
securities fraud.51  The majority of securities fraud claims are brought 
under § 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5,52 which allows plaintiffs to recover 
damages caused by an act or omission resulting in fraud or deceit in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.53
 
 47.  15 U.S.C. § 71(a)(2).  A prospectus is a printed document that describes a 
corporation’s business and is distributed to prospective buyers or investors.  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1259 (8th ed. 2004). 
  A plaintiff must 
allege and prove: (1) that the defendant made a material 
misrepresentation or omission (materiality); (2) that the defendant acted 
with a wrongful state of mind (scienter); (3) that the material 
misrepresentation or omission was made in connection with the 
 48.  An offeror or seller is someone who successfully solicits the purchase of 
securities motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or 
those of the securities owner.  Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1988). 
 49.  See, e.g., Miller v. Thane Int’l, Inc., 519 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2008); Benzon 
v. Morgan Stanley Distrib., Inc., 420 F.3d 598, 608 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Adams Golf, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 2004); Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 
297 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2002); Gasner v. Bd. of Superintendents of the County 
of Dinwiddie, Va., 103 F.3d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 50.  15 U.S.C. § 78(a). 
 51.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 
(1976); Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Origin of 10b-5 and its Place Among 
the Fraud Provisions, in 1 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD § 2:11 (2d 
ed. 2009). 
 52.  Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, SEC Rule 10b-5 and its New Statute 
of Limitations: The Circuits Defy the Supreme Court, 51 BUS. LAW. 309, 310 (1996). 
 53.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  Although neither § 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 explicitly 
provides for a private cause of action, the availability of a 10b-5 action is now beyond 
doubt because of legislative acquiescence, judicial consensus, and the test of time.  See 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).  
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purchase or sale of a security (in connection with); (4) that the plaintiff 
relied on the material misrepresentation (reliance); (5) that the plaintiff 
suffered an economic loss as a result (damages); and (6) that the material 
misrepresentation actually caused the loss (loss causation).54
2. The Contract with America and the  
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act  
 
After the enactment of these laws, “America’s financial markets 
became the envy of the world” and foreign capital flowed into the 
United States from investors assured that American markets were not 
being manipulated.55  These investors received assurance because 
defrauded investors could bring private actions to recover damages upon 
a violation of the securities laws.56
Yet in the 1990s, Congress perceived a threat to the stability of 
American financial markets from frivolous investor suits.5
 
7  In response, 
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(“PSLRA”) to encourage plaintiffs’ lawyers to pursue only merited 
claims.58  To do this, Congress imposed a heightened pleading 
requirement that: mandated that plaintiffs plead facts with particularity 
and a strong inference of scienter;59 revised the ways lead plaintiffs and 
counsel were selected in securities class actions;60 enhanced Rule 11’s 
application in the securities context;61 and stayed discovery pending a 
motion to dismiss.62  However, the PSLRA simply shifted securities 
litigation to state courts.63
 
 54.  Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005). 
  Thus, in 1998, as a supplement to the 
PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act (“SLUSA”) that made federal courts the exclusive venue for class 
 55.  Michael J. Kaufman, The PSLRA, Enron and Laxity, in SECURITIES LITIGATION: 
DAMAGES § 4:4 (2010) (Judge Abner J. Mikva discussing the history of the securities 
laws). 
 56.  S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8 (1995) reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687. 
 57.  Id. at 4-5. 
 58.  Id. at 4, 6. 
 59.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 
308, 313 (2007). 
 60.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a). 
 61.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1)-(2). 
 62.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (stay of discovery provision). 
 63. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ET. AL, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS,1047 (10th ed. 2007). 
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actions alleging fraud in the sale of certain securities.64
3. Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley   
 
However, “[i]n 2001, a corporate scandal of unprecedented 
magnitude struck the American economy.  It began with the collapse of 
Enron in late 2001.  Within eight months, three other corrupt corporate 
giants had followed Enron into bankruptcy: Worldcom, Global Crossing, 
and Adelphia.  Each had the same problem: fraudulent managers who 
had cooked the books and looted the companies.”65  In response, in 
2003, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), which had 
several effects on corporate governance.  It required principal executive 
officers to certify that each annual and quarterly report filed with the 
SEC contained no false or misleading information and that the financial 
statements fairly represented the financial condition of the company.66  
SOX also provided criminal penalties if the CEO or CFO knowingly 
certified false information.67  Additionally, SOX required that each 
annual report filed by the company discuss the internal controls 
established to guard against fraud and assess their effectiveness.68
SOX was the only legislation to recognize the link between 
bankruptcy and securities fraud actions.  Before SOX, the bankruptcy 
laws permitted wrongdoers to discharge judgments or settlements for 
securities fraud in bankruptcy.6
 
9  Congress sought “to help defrauded 
investors recoup their losses and to hold accountable those who violate 
securities laws”70 by amending the Code to render nondischargeable 
debts arising from the violation of laws and regulations dealing with 
securities.71
 
 64.  The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 
78u; see Cal. Pub. Emps’ Ret. Sys. v. Worldcom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 98 (2d Cir. 2004).  
According to a joint House-Senate Committee Report, the decline in federal securities 
class action suits that occurred after the passage of PSLRA was accompanied by a 
nearly identical increase in state court filings.  See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 14-15 
(1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
  However, Congress has never elaborated on bankruptcy’s 
 65.  LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 145 (2005). 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a). 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 1350(c). 
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a)-(b). 
 69. 15 U.S.C. § 7202. 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 7202. 
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2). 
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effects on securities fraud litigation.  Nor has Congress ever addressed 
bankruptcy’s implications for securities fraud litigation actions against 
non-debtors. 
C. BANKRUPTCY’S PROTECTION FOR THE DEBTOR-COMPANY 
Apart from the practical reason securities fraud plaintiffs do not 
pursue insolvent companies (the company is broke), the Code also 
serves to deter recovery for securities fraud.  Without providing an 
extensive overview of a securities fraud claimant’s path through the 
debtor-company’s bankruptcy, this Part highlights three key points that 
deter vigorous pursuit of securities fraud claims against a debtor: (1) the 
automatic stay; (2) the partial disapproval of the class action in 
bankruptcy; and (3) the absolute priority rule that subordinates 
shareholders’ claims. 
First, the automatic stay under Section 362 of the Code stops 
securities fraud litigation.72  The automatic stay is a fundamental aspect 
of the Code because it provides the debtor a “breathing spell” from 
creditors and collection actions.73
 
 72.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). See, e.g., Caprin v. Simon Transp. Servs., Inc., 99 F. 
App’x 150, 153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004) (non-precedential disposition); In re Spring Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199-12000 (D. Kan. 2002); In re ComDisco Sec. 
Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1261, n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Brick v. Dominion Mortg. & 
Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283, 309-10 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). 
  Although securities fraud plaintiffs 
 73.  S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840. 
Depending on the federal circuit, actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are 
void or voidable.  Compare Mann v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co., 316 F.3d 1, *3 (1st 
Cir. 2003) (stating that actions taken in violation of the stay are void) and E. 
Refractories, Co., Inc. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 157 F.3d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(same), and In re Myers, 491 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2007) (same), and Chao v. Hosp. 
Staffing Servs., Inc. 270 F.3d 374, 384 (6th Cir. 2001) (same), and Middle Tenn. News 
Co., Inc. v. Charnel of Cinn., Inc., 250 F.3d 1077, 1082 (7th Cir. 2001) (same), and 
Griffin v. Wardrobe (In re Wardrobe), 559 F.3d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 2009) (same), and 
Franklin Sav. Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 31 F.3d 1020, 1022 (10th Cir. 
1994) (same), and United States v. White, 466 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2006) (same), 
with Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that 
actions taken in violation of the stay are only voidable), and Bronson v. United States, 
46 F.3d 1573, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (same).  The automatic stay is so important, that 
if one violates it, the bankruptcy court may award punitive damages, including costs 
and attorneys fees, to the debtor.  11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1); see also Kassover v. Computer 
Depot, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1205, 1213-14 (D. Minn. 1987) (awarding attorneys’ fees to 
defendants who moved to dismiss securities class action filed in violation of the 
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can—and often do—move to lift the automatic stay “for cause,”74 this 
proves difficult.  The bankruptcy courts have relied on aspects inherent 
in all securities litigation to justify the refusal to lift the automatic stay.  
For example, the bankruptcy courts refuse to lift the automatic stay 
because shareholders’ claims are subordinated under the Code, so they 
will likely recover nothing.75  Further, bankruptcy courts conclude that 
the extensive discovery likely to result from securities litigation will 
impair the debtor’s fresh start, and thus refuse to lift the stay.76
Second, some federal circuits do not permit a proof of claim to be 





  All creditors, including 
 74.  11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (“On request of a party in interest and after notice and a 
hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this 
section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay—(1) 
for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such 
party in interest . . . .”).  Whether cause exists is determined case by case.  See In re 
ComDisco, Inc., 271 B.R. 273, 276 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 75.  In re Chan, 355 B.R. 494, 498 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (stating that if the claim 
is going to be discharged in a no-asset case, there is no purpose to further litigation to 
determine the extent and existence of liability); In re ComDisco, Inc., 271 B.R. at 280-
81; In re Towner Petroleum Co., 48 B.R. 182, 184-85 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985); see 
also 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (1984) (“[A] claim arising from rescission of a purchase or sale 
of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for damages arising from the 
purchase or sale of such a security . . . shall be subordinated to all claims or interests 
that are senior to or equal the claim or interest represented by such security, except that 
if such security is common stock, such claim has the same priority as common stock.”); 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). 
 76.  See ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc. v. Miller (In re ProvinceTown Boston 
Airline, Inc.), 52 B.R. 620, 624 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).;see also Adelphia Commc’ns 
Corp. v. Rigas (In re Adelphia Commc’ns, Corp.), 293 B.R. 337, 357-58 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2003) (extending automatic stay to preserve the “level playing field” the 
bankruptcy court had effected with securities fraud claimants and non-debtors); In re 
Rickel Home Ctrs. Inc., 199 B.R. 498, 501 (Bankr. D. Del. 1996) (issuing automatic 
stay because of discovery concerns); In re Circle K Corp., 121 B.R. 257, 261 (Bankr. D. 
Ariz. 1990) (extending automatic stay to directors and officers because of discovery 
concerns); Stoller v. Baldwin-United Corp., 41 B.R. 884, 890-92 (D.C. Ohio 1984) 
(extending the automatic stay to non-debtors because plaintiffs could benefit from 
bankruptcy discovery and thus, refrain from engaging in civil discovery). But cf. In re 
LJM2 Co-Inv., L.P., 327 B.R. 786, 795 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (lifting the stay to 
allow for limited discovery). 
 77.  Sheftelman v. Standard Metals Corp. (In re Standard Metals Corp.), 817 F.2d 
625, 631-32 (10th Cir. 1987); see also In re W.R. Grace & Co., 316 F. App’x 134, 136 
(3d Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential decision). 
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securities fraud plaintiffs, must file a proof of claim during the 
bankruptcy proceedings to preserve their claim against the debtor.78  
However, individual suits for securities fraud are often uneconomical, so 
the claims are aggregated in the form of a class action.79  Although 
persons who have already filed a proof of claim in bankruptcy can later 
request the bankruptcy court to certify them as a class,80 the courts 
disagree on whether a person can file a class proof of claim on behalf of 
others who have yet to file a proof of claim.81  This disagreement stems 
from Bankruptcy Rule 3001, which requires that a proof of claim be 
executed by the “creditor or the creditor’s authorized agent.”82  Courts 
that do not allow class proofs of claims on behalf of persons yet to file 
reason that lead plaintiffs are not “authorized agents” per the text and 
that class actions have limited utility in bankruptcy since a bankruptcy 
proceeding is already a collective proceeding similar to a class action.83
Third, the bankruptcy priority rules act as a barrier to securities 
fraud claims because they diminish the prospects of any significant 
recovery.  Section 1129(b) and Section 510(b) of the Code (collectively, 
 
 
 78.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003.  The bankruptcy court sets a bar date before which all 
creditors must file their proofs of claim.  Id.  A court may extend this time for cause or 
excusable neglect.  See In re Pettibone Corp., 123 B.R. 304, 308 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1990). 
 79.  E.g., David S. Evans, Class Certification, the Merits, and Expert Evidence, 11 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2002); James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class 
Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 497 (1997); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 
U.S. 156, 185–86 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 80.  See, e.g., In re Standard Metals Corp., 817 F.2d at 631-32; In re FirstPlus Fin., 
Inc., 248 B.R. 60, 69 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000). 
 81.  Compare Reid v. White Motor Corp., 886 F.2d 1462, 1470 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(permitting class proof of claim), and In re Charter Co., 876 F.2d 866, 873 (11th Cir. 
1989) (same), and Birting Fisheries, Inc. v. Lane (In re Birting Fisheries, Inc.), 92 F.3d 
939, 939-40 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), and In re Am. Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 493 
(7th Cir. 1988) (same), with In re Standard Metals Corp., 817 F.2d at 632 (denying 
class proof of claim), and In re Amdura Corp., 130 B.R. 575 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) 
(same), and In re Texaco Inc., 81 B.R. 820 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same). 
 82.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(b). 
 83.  In re Computer Learning Ctrs., Inc., 344 B.R. 79, 91-93 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006). 
For a full discussion of this approach, see Luisa Kaye, Note, The Case Against Class 
Proofs of Claim in Bankruptcy, 66 N.Y.U.L. REV. 897 (1991).  But see In re Charter 
Co., 876 F.2d at 873 (arguing that although class members do not consent to original 
filing beforehand, it is inherent in the nature of a class action and that class filing cannot 
prejudice the class members in any way because class action procedures, such as notice, 
representatives of the named class members, and opt-out provisions, protect their 
interests). 
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the “absolute priority rule”) make any victory private securities fraud 
plaintiffs might obtain in the bankruptcy court a hollow one by 
subordinating a securities fraud claim to all other claims in bankruptcy.84  
This rule of absolute priority requires that creditors take before 
shareholders.85  Plans of reorganization must classify claims, with 
different classes receiving different orders of priority for payment, and, 
under the priority rules, unless creditors are paid in full (or unless each 
class of creditors consents otherwise) the debtor’s shareholders are not 
entitled to recover any property through the bankruptcy process.86  In the 
normal course of Chapter 11, creditors (secured and unsecured) take 
before the shareholders, the plaintiffs in a securities fraud suit.87
 
 84.  Gen. Holdings, LLC v. S&J Diving, Inc. (In re Seaquest Diving, LP), 579 F.3d 
411 (5th Cir. 2009). 
  These 
 85.  The absolute priority rule has its roots in Northern Pacific v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 
482 (1913).  At the time of Boyd, it was standard practice in receiverships (the 
predecessors to modern bankruptcy proceedings) to give old bondholders a stake in the 
new company and ask shareholders to contribute new cash in return for continuing their 
interest, but to exclude general unsecured creditors.  SKEEL, JR., supra note 9, at 67.  
After Northern Pacific Railway was reorganized, one of the general unsecured creditors 
argued to the Supreme Court that reorganizers should not be allowed to give an ongoing 
interest to shareholders without giving anything to unsecured creditors.  Id.  The 
Supreme Court agreed and the ‘absolute priority rule’ was born.  Id.  Congress enacted 
Section 510(b) in response to a line of decisions in which some courts allowed 
shareholders equal priority with unsecured creditors when bringing securities fraud 
claims.  Int’l Wireless Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Wireless Commc’ns Holdings, Inc. (In re 
Int’l Wireless Commc’ns Holdings, Inc.), 68 F. App’x 275, 278 (3d Cir. 2003) (non-
precedential disposition).  In a seminal law review article, this approach was criticized 
by John J. Slain and Homer Kripke.  Slain and Kripke argued that shareholders assumed 
two risks: (1) the risk of business insolvency from whatever cause; and (2) the risk of 
illegality in securities issuance.  John J. Slain & Homer Kripke, The Interface Between 
Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy – Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities 
Issuance Between Securityholders and the Issuer’s Creditors, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 261, 
286 (1973).  The absolute priority rule is also used to subordinate directors’ and 
officers’ claims for indemnification of costs associated with defending against securities 
fraud litigation.  See, e.g., In re Mid-Am. Waste Sys., Inc., 228 B.R. 816, 829 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 1999). 
 86.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).  The entire “plan” process may be short-
circuited by the sale of the business under § 363, which often results in inadequate 
recovery by small creditors.  Mendales, supra note 33, at 992. 
 87.  Any class (including the class of unsecured creditors) may reject the plan and 
then the plan cannot be confirmed.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a).  But the debtor may confirm 
the plan by cramming it down the throat of the rejecting class under Section 1129(b) if: 
(1) the plan does not discriminate unfairly between the classes; and (2) it is fair and 
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shareholders take last, because, just as they gladly accept the upside 
potential increases in their shares’ value, whatever the reason, they also 
assume the risk of decline in value for whatever the reason, including 
fraud.88  If shareholders are permitted to rescind their stock purchase, the 
risk of securities fraud then would be impermissibly shifted to the 
general, unsecured creditors, who purchased no stock.89  The absolute 
priority rule makes it unlikely that securities fraud plaintiffs will receive 
any distribution,90
 
equitable.  ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS 655-56 (5th ed. 2006).  “In the bankruptcy reorganizations of large, publicly 
held companies, plans are rarely crammed down against resisting classes of creditors or 
shareholders. There is a widespread belief among practitioners that cram down is 
expensive and impractical.”  Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate 
Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 
U. PA. L. REV. 669, 682 (1993). 
 and so has the practical effect of prohibiting securities 
 88.  In re Int’l Wireless Commc’ns Holdings, Inc., 68 F. App’x at 278; In re 
Worldcom, Inc., 329 B.R. 10, 14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Obviously, the sophisticated 
and intelligent persons and firms who invested in Worldcom, Enron, Global Crossing, 
and the whole litany of corporate fiascos of recent years never imagined that their 
investments would be subjected to the kinds of risks that brought these and many other 
companies into bankruptcy in recent years.  But the plain fact is that all of these 
debacles happened, and when [the investors] purchased their stock, that is exactly what 
they ‘subscribed’ to, just like all the other disappointed investors in this or any other era 
of capitalism.”); John J. Rapisardi, Subordination of Claims Relating to Stock-Based 
Compensation, 239 N.Y.L.J. 3 (May 14, 2008). 
 89.  Melanie J. Schmid, Note, A Congressional Montage of Two Systems of Law - 
Mandatory Subordination Under the Code, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 361, 364 
(2005).  Section 510(b) subordinates all securities claims, regardless of nature, scope, or 
extent of risk.  E.g., SeaQuest Diving, LP v. S&J Diving, Inc. (In re SeaQuest Diving, 
LP), 579 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Am. Wagering, Inc., 493 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th 
Cir. 2007); In re Worldcom, Inc., 329 B.R. 10, 14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). So long as 
the nature of the harm complained of by a shareholder results from the purchase or sale 
of securities, the claim falls within Section 510(b)—even absent an allegation of fraud.  
Baroda Hill Invs., Ltd. v. Telegroup, Inc. (In re Telegroup, Inc.), 281 F.3d 133, 140-42 
(3d Cir. 2002); In re Worldcom, Inc., 329 B.R. at 14; see also In re SeaQuest Diving, 
LP, 579 F.3d 411 (subordinating claim under 510(b) because it arose from purchase of 
securities and transaction was rescinded and no fraud took place); Laurence May, 
Claimants Fight Subordination: The Expansion of Section 510(b) Continues, 242 
N.Y.L.J. 9 (Sept. 28, 2009) (discussing recent circuit decisions that interpret Section 
510(b) broadly). 
 90.  In re ComDisco, Inc., 271 B.R. 273, 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[U]nder § 
510(b) the securities fraud claims are likely to be subordinated to creditor claims, and 
dealt with on the same priority as the shareholder interests. . . . The effect of that 
subordination is not possible to predict with certainty. But one very real possibility is 
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fraud class actions against the debtor-company by reducing the 
economic incentive for litigation.91  Even Section 523(a)(19), which 
specifically excepts from discharge any judgment or settlement on 
account of securities fraud,92 does not ensure recovery for securities 
fraud victims as it applies only to Chapter 7 cases,93 which are usually 
no-asset cases.94
 
III. CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY’S IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE 
SECURITIES FRAUD SUITS AGAINST NON-DEBTORS 
 
Corporate bankruptcy spawns securities litigation that endures for 
years, almost decades, after the corporation originally files for 
bankruptcy.95  The extensive liability scheme under the securities laws 
reaches all those involved in a stock offering marred with 
misrepresentations96 and those who manipulate stock prices by fraud.97
 
that the plaintiff class claims will be discharged by the plan without any payment. That 
will happen if the confirmed plan makes no distribution at the equity level. In other 
words, if the reorganization value of the Debtor is insufficient to pay all of the $4 
billion in claims (and if the creditors do not agree to a distribution at the equity level), 
then by operation of law the plaintiff’s claims against the Debtor will be discharged 
without any possibility of a recovery.”). 
  
A company’s bankruptcy may, however, shield non-debtors—like the 
company’s officers and directors, underwriters, accountants, attorneys, 
or stock analysts—from liability even though the securities laws would 
 91.  2 HOWARD J. STEINBERG, BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION § 10:83 (2008). 
 92.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). 
 93.  In re WorldCom, Inc., 329 B.R. at 13. 
 94.  Ed Flynn, et al., Chapter 7 Asset Cases, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 22 (2003). 
 95.  See Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2008) (“In December 
2001, Enron Corporation filed for bankruptcy.  Seven years later, litigation involving 
the Enron collapse endures.”); John Gibeaut, As WorldCom Turns, Cases Pile Up, 90 
A.B.A. J. 40, 42 (Sept. 2004) (“[P]arallel proceedings have multiplied with the wave of 
corporate scandals.  They are especially common in securities fraud, where the sheer 
volume of money and countless number of victims ensure an almost endless . . .  
plaintiff procession. . .”). 
 96.  Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288-89 (2d Cir. 1969).  A 
fundamental purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 “was to substitute a philosophy of 
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard 
of business ethics in the securities industry.”  SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
 97.  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). 
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hold them accountable.  This non-debtor protection inhibits investor 
recovery for fraud and subverts the aims of the securities laws. 
This Part shows that a company’s bankruptcy can deter investor 
suits for fraud against non-debtors.  First, there is some suggestion that 
bankruptcy courts can void pre-petition settlements with non-debtors, 
thereby undoing any recovery investors achieved.98  Second, bankruptcy 
courts can prevent any adjudication of non-debtors’ liability by 
extending the automatic stay, which turns into a de facto release from 
liability.99  Further still, securities fraud actions against non-debtors may 
be uneconomical after a company files for bankruptcy because of 
duplicative discovery costs; one appellate court has even concluded that 
certification of a class action against a non-debtor is an abuse of 
discretion when the claim may be resolved as part of the company’s 
bankruptcy.100  Last, non-debtors may be released from liability for 
securities fraud through the debtor’s reorganization plan.101
A. VOIDING PRE-PETITION SETTLEMENTS WITH NON-DEBTORS 
 
A corporation’s bankruptcy can affect securities fraud settlements 
entered into with non-debtors before the bankruptcy filing.  For 
example, the debtor-company’s bankruptcy trustee may attempt to void 
a pre-petition settlement between plaintiff-investors and the debtor-
company’s directors and officers if that settlement utilized certain 
insurance proceeds.102  The trustee may argue that the settlement 
constituted a voidable preference or fraudulent conveyance under the 
Code.103
 
 98.  See supra Part III.A. 
  In In re Imperial, plaintiff-investors brought a securities fraud 
 99.  See supra Part III.B. 
 100.  See supra Part III.C. 
 101.  See supra Part III.D. 
 102.  See Imperial Corp. of Am. v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Specthrie & Lerach (In 
re Imperial Corp. of Am.), 144 B.R. 115, 116 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1992); Durkin v. 
Shields (In re Imperial Corp. of Am.), No. 92-1003-IEG (LSP), 1997 WL 808631, at *1 
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1997); Durkin v. Shields (In re Imperial Corp. of Am.), No. 92-
1003-IEG (LSP), 1997 WL 808628, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1997). 
 103.  11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (stating that the trustee may avoid any transfer made for 
the benefit of a creditor on the account of antecedent debt made while the debtor was 
insolvent if it is made within 90 days before the date of the filing of the debtor’s 
petition); 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (enabling a trustee to avoid a transfer if it was made by the 
debtor with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors). 
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class action against Imperial’s officers and directors.104  The parties 
settled and the settlement was funded mostly by Imperial’s insurer.105  
Imperial filed for bankruptcy a few days after the court approved the 
class’s attorney’s fees.106  Imperial’s bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid 
the settlement and claimed that the insurance proceeds were estate 
property, thereby making the settlement a preferential transfer.107  
Although the court refused the trustee’s avoidance action, it only did so 
because it found that the insurance proceeds were not property of the 
estate: the policy provided direct coverage to the officers and directors, 
as opposed to entity or indirect coverage.108  Imperial makes clear that 
the outcome of such an avoidance action depends on the type of 
coverage.  It suggests that indirect or entity coverage—property of the 
estate109—may justify voiding a pre-petition, non-debtor settlement if 
the other elements for a voidable transfer are met.110
B. DE FACTO RELEASES: THE AUTOMATIC STAY AND  
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 
 
“It is commonplace for securities fraud actions to be pending 
against officers and directors of a debtor that is concurrently in a case 
under the Bankruptcy Code.”111
 
 104.   In re Imperial Corp. of Am., 144 B.R. at 117. 
  When a company with public debt or 
equity gets into financial difficulty, directors and officers are often 
targeted by securities fraud plaintiffs who complain that the directors 
and officers failed to adequately disclose the pre-bankruptcy condition 
 105.  Id.  Under the settlement agreement, a settlement fund was created, which 
included $13 million in cash and 1.5 million warrants for the purchase of stock at $2.50 
per share.  Durkin, 1997 WL 808631, at *1.   Imperial’s D&O insurer provided $12.5 
million to the settlement fund.  Id. 
 106.  In re Imperial Corp. of Am., 144 B.R. at 117. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 117-18. 
 109.  See supra Part III.B (discussing when insurance is considered property of the 
estate). 
 110.  John Collen, Bankruptcy and D&O Insurance, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 121, 
142-43 (2002). 
 111.  In re Recoton, Corp., 307 B.R. 751, 759 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also In 
re DVI Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 198 (E.D. Pa. 2008); In re First Cent. Fin. 
Corp., 238 B.R. 9, 15 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Mortg. & Realty Trust, 125 B.R. 
575, 578 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991). 
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of the company.112  A company’s bankruptcy can prevent the 
adjudication of a non-debtor’s liability for securities fraud.  This is quite 
remarkable given that Congress explicitly relegated securities claims to 
the federal courts—and not the bankruptcy courts—when it enacted the 
“reference” provisions of the Code.113
 
 112.  THOMAS J. SALERNO, ET AL., THE EXECUTIVE GUIDE TO CORPORATE 
BANKRUPTCY,104 (2001). “[W]hether a company can continue as a going concern can 
become an allegation in a shareholders’ class action complaint.  For example, the 
complaint in a recent securities suit against NextWave Wireless alleges that the 
company had concealed questions surrounding its ability to continue as a going 
concern.”  Kevin LaCroix, Corporate Defaults, Bankruptcies, and D&O Claims, IV 
INSIGHTS,2-3 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.oakbridgeins.com/newsletter.htm. 
  Contrary to Congress’s intent to 
leave securities litigation to federal district court, bankruptcy courts 
Corporations are in a precarious position disclosing bankruptcy prospects.  Whether the 
company will plunge into bankruptcy is a material fact that any reasonable investor 
would want to know.  But if the company is on the verge of bankruptcy, disclosing that 
information will likely result in a significant drop in the company’s stock price, pushing 
them into bankruptcy and impairing the company’s ability to finalize any deals.  If the 
company does not disclose the situation, the company risks investor suits, but may be 
able to keep the company from slipping into insolvency.  See Miller v. Champion 
Enters., Inc., 346 F.3d 660, 682 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that because of this double-
effect, the defendant-corporation’s refusal to disclose bankruptcy information was not 
an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care and thus did not amount to a 
strong inference of recklessness). 
 113.  Under the mandatory withdrawal provisions of the Code, a district court must 
withdraw the bankruptcy court’s reference if the proceedings require consideration of 
both the Code and other federal laws.  28 U.S.C. § 157(d).  Congress specifically 
contemplated securities cases when it enacted the mandatory withdrawal portion of 
Section 157(d) of the Code.  In the floor debate, a House Representative stated that the 
mandatory withdrawal provision would apply to “related causes which may require 
consideration of both title 11 issues and other federal laws including cases involving the 
National Labor Relations Act, civil rights law, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 
and other similar laws.”  1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3-53 n.114 (quoting 130 Cong. 
Rec. H1850 (Mar. 21, 1984)) (emphasis added).  But courts disagree as to the meaning 
of “other federal law” with some courts concluding that mandatory withdrawal is 
required whenever consideration of the federal law is involved, see, e.g., Burger King 
Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 730 (D. Kan. 1986), and others concluding 
that mandatory withdrawal is required when only the federal law is necessary for the 
resolution of the case, see, e.g., Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. v. Rigas (In re Adelphia 
Commc’ns Corp.), No. 02 Civ. 8495 GBD, 2003 WL 21297258, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 
4, 2003); Randall v. Am. Solar King Corp. (In re Am. Solar King Corp.), 92 B.R. 207, 
210 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Price v. Craddock, 85 B.R. 570, 572 (D. Colo. 1988); In re 
White Motor Corp., 42 B.R. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Chan, 355 B.R. 494, 506 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006). 
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impede this litigation by extending the automatic stay. 
Under the Code, directors and officers cannot avail themselves of 
the corporation’s automatic stay because it is for the benefit of the 
debtor.114  In theory, while the corporation is in bankruptcy, securities 
fraud plaintiffs should be able to pursue their claims against corporate 
officers and other liable parties.115  However, directors and officers 
attempt to extend the automatic stay to these securities fraud suits.  Even 
though this protection is not permanent (and thus distinct from an actual 
discharge or release, as discussed in Part III.D.),116 for practical 
purposes, if the directors and officers can extend automatic stay 
protection, the plaintiff-investors will settle their claims against the 
directors and officers as part of the company’s plan of reorganization.117
 
 114.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(3); see also McCartney v. Integra Nat’l Bank N., 106 
F.3d 506, 509-10 (3d Cir. 1997). 
  
 115.  One of the reviewers of this Article notes that generally a securities fraud case 
against non-debtors goes forward without the debtor-company named in the suit.  So, in 
practice, whether the court should extend the automatic stay usually is not an issue.  
Nevertheless, in the cases in which it does arise, it presents a considerable problem 
worthy of attention.  See, e.g., In re Phil. Newspapers, LLC, 407 B.R. 606, 615 (E.D. 
Pa. 2009); In re Cont’l Airlines, 177 B.R. 475, 479-81 (D. Del. 1993); In re Shearin 
Family Invs., LLC, No. 08-07082-8-JRL, 2009 WL 4042670, at *1-*2 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2009); In re SN Liquidation, Inc., 388 B.R. 579, 585 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2008).  Further, the existence of the possibility of a procedural bar such as the automatic 
stay will likely influence settlement values.  As cases abound in which directors and 
officers have moved to extend automatic stay protection, see, e.g., In re MCSi, Inc., 371 
B.R. 270 (S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. 534, 535 (S.D. Fla. 
2001); In re Uni-Marts, LLC, 404 B.R. 767, 780-82 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); In re 
Trans-Service Logistics, Inc., 304 B.R. 805, 807 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004); In re 
marchFIRST, Inc., 288 B.R. 526, 527-28 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002); and the possibility of 
extending the stay rises, costs increase and the plaintiff’s probability assessment of the 
chance of a successful verdict must account for this adverse possibility, thus lowering 
settlement values.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 568 (6th ed. 
2003) (discussing how settlement is a product of the probability of success on the merits 
less litigation costs). 
 116.  After a debtor receives a discharge in bankruptcy, the automatic stay is 
replaced with a section 524 post discharge injunction.  11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). This post- 
discharge injunction, however, does not affect the enforceability of any non-debtor 
liability for pre-petition debt.  Patronite v. Beeney (In re Beeney), 142 B.R. 360, 362 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992); In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 
1990). 
 117.  SALERNO, ET AL., supra note 112, at 105. A bankruptcy court can extend the 
automatic stay under both Section 362 and its general injunctive power under Section 
105.  In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. 534, 536 (S.D. Fla. 2001).  One of the central 
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Thus, extension of the automatic stay allows these claims to be resolved 
in the company’s bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy courts have extended automatic stay protection to 
corporate directors and officers under the guise of “unusual 
circumstances.”118  Unusual circumstances exist if there is sufficient 
identity between the debtor and the third party such that the debtor may 
be considered the real party defendant and a judgment against the third 
party will act as a judgment against the debtor.119  Directors and officers 
advance four “unusual circumstances” to extend automatic stay 
protection: (1) that a securities fraud suit will involve extensive 
discovery; (2) that the directors and officers are indemnified by the 
corporation’s insurance, which constitutes property of the estate; (3) that 
the directors and officers are integral to the debtor’s reorganization 
efforts; and (4) that findings in the suit against the directors and officers 
may bind the debtor through collateral estoppel or res judicata.120
 
issues in surviving to plan confirmation is protecting the directors and officers from 
securities fraud lawsuits.  SALERNO, ET AL., supra note 112, at 104. 
  These 
 118.  In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. at 536. Section 105(a) provides that a 
bankruptcy court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Code.  11 U.S.C. § 105(a).   Relief under 
Section 105 includes an injunction.   ProvinceTown Boston Airline Inc. v. Miller (In re 
ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc.), 52 B.R. 620, 624 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).   An 
injunction under Section 105(a) is an extraordinary remedy and more than perceived 
necessity is required to demonstrate its appropriateness.  E.g., In re First Cent. Fin. 
Corp., 238 B.R. 9, 20 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999).  The party seeking the injunction must 
show: (1) a strong probability on the merits; (2) irreparable injury if the relief sought is 
not granted; (3) the injunction will not cause substantial harm; and (4) the injunction 
will best serve the public interest.  In re ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc., 52 B.R. at 
624-25 (collecting cases).  Another source of equitable power is Section 1123(b)(6), 
which allows a Chapter 11 plan to include any appropriate provision so long as it is 
consistent with the Code.  11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6). 
 119.  A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999-1002 (4th Cir. 1986); In 
re Family Health Servs., Inc., 105 B.R. 937,942 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989); Rickel Home 
Ctrs., Inc. v. Baffa (In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc.), 199 B.R. 498, 500 (Bankr. D. Del. 
1996). This is an exception to the plain text of Section 362(a) which provides stay 
protection to the debtor alone, and thus, it is interpreted narrowly.  See In re First Cent. 
Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. at 19. 
 120.  See, e.g., In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. at 536; In re Reliance 
Acceptance Grp., Inc., 235 B.R. 548, 556 (D. Del. 1999); JNA-1 Corp. v. Uni-Marts, 
LLC (In re Uni-Marts, LLC), 404 B.R. 767, 780-81 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).  Not all 
courts though have extended the automatic stay to directors and officers.  See, e.g., In re 
MCSi, Inc., Sec. Litig., 371 B.R. 270, 274 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (refusing to extend stay 
because directors and officers were not entitled to insurance proceeds); Catholic Order 
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“unusual circumstances” are not so unusual at all, however; in fact, they 
exist in every securities fraud suit.  Further, the arguments are usually 
flawed in that they rely on faulty or untested premises.  This Part 
explores each of these arguments. 
1. Discovery Concerns 
In a related context where the debtor-company seeks to keep the 
stay in place to deny its directors and officers access to insurance funds, 
these companies argue that the stay should not be lifted because 
securities fraud actions involve extensive and intensive discovery.121  
This reasoning is equally applicable to a non-debtor’s effort to extend 
the stay.  Excessive and intensive discovery is a common criticism of 
securities fraud class actions.122  The courts have been receptive to this 
discovery concern and have refused to lift the stay (or be persuaded to 
extend its protection) even if the action is already filed in federal court 
and discovery already has begun.123
 
of Foresters v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1162-63 (N.D. 
Iowa 2004) (refusing to extend the stay because the non-debtor did not demonstrate 
unusual circumstances); In re Trans-Serv. Logistics, Inc., 304 B.R. 805, 808 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 2004) (refusing to extend the stay because the case involved only a single 
and straight-forward lawsuit); Maxwell v. Megliola (In re marchFIRST, Inc.), 288 B.R. 
526, 529-30 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (refusing to extend the stay because the insurance 
proceeds were not property of the estate); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. at 536-37 
(refusing to extend the stay because insurance proceeds were not property of the estate); 
Gray v. Hirsch, 230 B.R. 239, 243-44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to extend stay 
because suit would have no effect on debtor); In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc., 199 B.R. at 
500-01 (refusing to extend stay because non-debtors could not demonstrate unusual 
circumstances); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 104 B.R. 582, 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
1989) (refusing to extend stay where the non-debtor’s liability rests on his own breach 
of duty). 
  They want to protect the debtor 
 121.  See, e.g., Scott B. Schreiber & Andrew T. Karron, Back to the Future: The 
New Focus on Predictions as a Basis for Securities Fraud Claims, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 73 (1994); Shannon Rose Seldon, (Self-)Policing the Market: Congress’s Flawed 
Approach to Securities Law Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 57, 75 (2006). 
 122.  E.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741, (1974) 
(stating that the potential for abuse of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure may exist in securities litigation more than any other litigation, that 
extensive depositions of directors and officers takes up the time of a number of people, 
and in sum, forces defendants in terrorem into settlement). 
 123.  See In re ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc., 52 B.R. 620, 623 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1985).  ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc. (PBA) was one of the largest operators 
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from the bombardment of discovery that would impede reorganization 
efforts.124
But the argument rests on the faulty premise that discovery in 
securities fraud litigation is abusive and wrongly forces defendants to 
settle.  This widespread sentiment has not been empirically verified.12
 
5  
Furthermore, imposing high discovery costs is inconsistent with rational 
behavior for plaintiff-investors: plaintiff-investors front the cost of 
litigation (when victory is uncertain) and high discovery costs for 
defendants decrease available insurance proceeds—a vital source of 
funding for settlement or judgment if the company is in bankruptcy.126
 
of a commuter airline.  Id. at 622.  The plaintiffs, shareholders of PBA’s, filed suits 
against PBA and its directors, officers, and underwriter alleging that PBA failed to 
disclose in its prospectus accompanying its IPO certain charges and administrative 
actions by the Federal Aviation Authority against PBA which resulted in the revocation 
of PBA’s operating certificate.  Id., see also The Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2).  After 
PBA filed for bankruptcy, the plaintiffs sought to lift the automatic stay to proceed 
against PBA, and PBA, in response sought an extension of the automatic stay to its 
related non-debtors.  In re ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc., 52 B.R. at 622.  The 
district court ultimately refused to extend the automatic stay because several of the non-
debtors were no longer officers or directors, were never officers or directors, or had no 
connection with the debtor.  Id. at 626. 
 
 124.  In re ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc., 52 B.R. at 624; see also In re 
Towner Petroleum Co., 48 B.R. 182, 185, 191 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985) (refusing to 
lift automatic stay where debtor and non-debtors would be subject to extensive 
discovery from fraud case involving oil and gas leases); cf. Hoenig v. Hoffman (In re 
Hoffman), 33 B.R. 937, 941 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (allowing limited discovery). 
 125.  See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of 
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994) (documenting, “Faludi-style,” the myth of pervasive 
discovery abuse); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on 
Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 787 (1998) (stating that the debate over discovery 
reform was based on salient personal experiences, and not with the benefit of empirical 
evidence).  But there is still no working definition of what constitutes “appropriate” 
discovery.  Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The 
Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 688 (1998). 
 126.  See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and 
Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 777-78 (2009).  
D&O policies are “wasting” policies.  Thomas A. Dubbs, A Scotch Verdict on 
“Circularity” and Other Issues, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 455, 462 n.28 (2009).  A “wasting” 
policy is an insurance policy whereby the costs of defense are taken off the top and 
“waste” away at the policy; as litigation progresses, the available insurance funds 
reduces.  Judge Nicholas H. Politan, Mediating Securities Class Actions: A View from 
the Captain’s Quarters, 800 PLI/Lit 133, 137 (2009). 
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2. Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance 
Nearly all public companies have some form of directors’ and 
officers’ (“D&O”) liability insurance to protect them from securities 
litigation.127  A D&O liability insurance policy, generally an indemnity 
policy,128 offers three types of coverage: (1) direct (or “Side-A”) 
coverage;129 (2) indirect (or “Side B”) coverage; and (3) entity (or “Side 
C”) coverage.130  Direct coverage provides insurance coverage for any 
actual or alleged wrongful acts by the directors or officers while acting 
in their official capacities (unless the company has already indemnified 
them).131
 
 127.  Seth Van Aalten, Note, D&O Insurance in the Age of Enron: Protecting 
Officers and Directors in Corporate Bankruptcies, 22 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
457 460 (2003).  The deductibles tend to be substantial.  DICTIONARY OF INSURANCE 
TERMS 134 (4th ed. 2000).  D&O policies provide an incentive for directors and officers 
to make risky decisions necessary to corporate growth.  Eric W. Collins, Note, Level 3 
v. Federal Insurance: Do You Know What is in Your Directors and Officers Liability 
Insurance Policy, 73 UMKC L. REV. 199, 208 (2004). 
  Direct coverage is the only kind of coverage that actually 
D&O insurance was first introduced after the enactment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, but 
it was not widely purchased until after the Supreme Court decided Basic v. Levinson, 
where the Supreme Court created a presumption of reliance for lawsuits involving 
securities traded in the secondary public markets, now known as the fraud-on-the-
market theory.  Van Aalten, supra note 127, at 460; Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 246-47 (1988).  The result of the Basic decision was an upsurge in securities class 
actions and expanded liability as it allowed for widely dispersed investors to aggregate 
small claims and threaten a company with daunting damages.  A.C. Pritchard, 
Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of 
Securities Class Action Reform, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217 (2008). 
 128.  SUSAN N.K. GUMMOW, BANKRUPTCY AND INSURANCE LAW MANUAL 133 (3d 
ed. 2009).  These D&O policies differ from traditional professional liability policies in 
that the D&O policies do not obligate the insurer to provide a defense, but only to 
reimburse expenses incurred in defense of the claims against the insured.  Lee R. Russ 
& Thomas F. Segalla, Directors and Officers: General Coverage Terms, in 9A COUCH 
ON INSURANCE, § 131:31 (2009). 
 129.  Direct insurance coverage generally comes into play when the company is 
insolvent.  Bonnie Brewer Cavanaugh, Looking for Trouble: With Litigation Rising, 
Insurers Advise Companies to Shore Up Their Liability Defenses, 109 BEST’S REV. 49 
(Mar. 2009). 
 130.  GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 133-34. 
 131.  GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 133.  Covered losses include compensatory 
damages, settlements, and legal fees incurred by the person in connection with service 
as a director/officer of the corporation.  Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why 
the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ 
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covers the individual directors and officers.132  Conversely, indirect 
coverage provides the company with insurance coverage when the 
company has indemnified its directors or officers for a loss.133  Last, 
entity coverage insures the company for any claims brought against it.134
If the company has D&O insurance (and well-over ninety percent 
of public companies do13
 
5), the bankruptcy court may extend automatic 
stay protection so long as the insurance policy and its proceeds are 
considered property of the company’s bankruptcy estate.136  Officers and 
directors argue that allowing a shareholder’s claim to go forward will 
harm the debtor-company by diminishing funds available under the 
D&O policies through defense costs and judgment awards, thereby 
adversely affecting property of the estate.137  The majority of the federal 
circuits state that insurance policies are property of the estate and 
protected by the automatic stay,138 but whether the proceeds from a 
D&O policy are property of the estate is assessed case by case.139
 
Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1164 (2006).   According to most 
policies, a director or officer usually includes any past, present, or future director or 
officer of the company.  Russ & Segalla, supra note 128. 
  
 132.  Griffith, supra note 131, at 1164. 
 133.  GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 133. 
 134.  GUMMOW, supra note 128 at 134. 
 135.  Griffith, supra note 131, at 1168. 
 136.  See, e.g., Bidermann Indus. USA Inc. v. Zelnik (In re Bidermann Indus. USA, 
Inc.), 200 B.R. 779 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing that Section 362 stays actions 
that interfere with property of the estate, and that if insurance policies are used to satisfy 
judgments against non-debtors and debtor has an interest in those proceeds, the 
insurance policies may be property of the estate); Maxicare Health Plans v. Centinela 
Mammoth Hosp. (In re Family Health Servs., Inc.), 105 B.R. 937, 942-43 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 1989). The automatic stay precludes any act to obtain possession of property of the 
estate.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3); see also Circle K Corp. v. Marks (In re Circle K Corp.), 
121 B.R. 257, 258, 261 (Bankr. N.D. Ariz. 1990). 
 137.  In re Reliance Acceptance Grp., Inc., 235 B.R. 548, 556-57 (D. Del. 1999). 
 138.  See, e.g., MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville, Corp. (In re Johns-Manville 
Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1988); A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Piccinin (In re A.H. 
Robins, Co., Inc.), 788 F.2d 994, 1001 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176, 184 
(5th Cir. 1984); In re First Cent. Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. 9, 16 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 139.  See Houston v. Edgeworth, (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 56 (5th Cir. 1993); 
In re Metro. Mortg. & Sec. Co., Inc., 325 B.R. 851, 857-58 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005) 
(stating that an insurance policy is not property of the estate where the debtor has no 
legal interest in the proceeds); In re Sfuzzi, Inc., 191 B.R. 664, 668 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
1996).  The distinction between the insurance policy and its proceeds is necessary as a 
practical matter: the bankruptcy courts want to allow directors and officers to obtain 
insurance proceeds, but also prohibit the debtor’s insurer from cancelling the policy.  
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Generally, if the D&O policy provides direct coverage, then the 
proceeds are not property of the estate and the bankruptcy court will not 
extend the automatic stay.140  Similarly, if the debtor’s plan of 
reorganization extinguishes directors’ and officers’ claims under D&O 
policies, the automatic stay should not be extended.141  For indirect and 
entity coverage situations, however, if the debtor-company is exposed in 
any way to claims covered under the D&O policy, the proceeds are 
property of the estate.142
If both the directors, officers, and the company have an interest in 
the insurance proceeds, the bankruptcy court will extend the automatic 




Cf. In re Minoco, Grp. of Cos., Ltd., 799 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1986). 
  This competition 
 140.  See La. World Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re La. World Exposition, 
Inc.), 832 F.2d 1391, 1400-01 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 141.  See In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. 534, 537 (S.D. Fla. 2001).  In In re 
Sunbeam, Sunbeam filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and its directors and officers sought 
to extend the automatic stay to securities litigation against them.  Id. at 535.  The court 
refused to extend the stay because: (1) Sunbeam did not also seek extension of the stay, 
indicating that these managers were not necessary to reorganization; (2) Sunbeam was 
not required to indemnify the non-debtors for any costs or judgments; and (3) the 
recovery from the managers’ insurance would not effect the debtor’s recovery because 
the debtor had no right to those proceeds.  Id. at 536-37. 
 142.  In re CHS Elec., Inc., 261 B.R. 538 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001) (stating that entity 
coverage itself does not mean that the proceeds are property of the estate because “in 
actuality,” there was no entity coverage); see also In re First Cent. Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. 
9, 17 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); but see In re Vitek, 51 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 
1995) (stating that where a D&O policy provides coverage for judgments or losses 
against the bankrupt corporation itself, the proceeds belong to the estate regardless of 
the presence of personal liability coverage for officers and directors). 
 143.  E.g., In re Metro. Mortg. & Sec. Co., Inc., 325 B.R. 851, 857 (Bankr. E.D. 
Wash. 2005); In re First Central Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. at 17.  A securities fraud claim 
must have been filed against the debtor that implicates insurance coverage; if no party 
expresses any interest in making these claims, a bankruptcy court should not extend 
automatic stay protection to directors and officers based on mere speculation.  See, e.g., 
In re Adelphia Commc’ns, Corp., 298 B.R. 49, 53-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Reliance 
Acceptance Grp., Inc., 235 B.R. 548, 561 (D. Del. 1999); Official Unsecured Creditors’ 
Comm. v. Bowen (In re Phar-Mor, Inc., Sec. Litig.), 164 B.R. 903, 905 (W.D. Pa. 
1994).  In this situation, the available insurance provides no tangible benefit to the 
estate.  In re First Central Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. at 18.  “Claiming the [debtor-company] 
now h[as] a property interest in those proceeds makes no sense at this juncture.  Such 
argument would be akin to a car owner with collision coverage claiming he has the right 
to proceeds from his policy simply because there is a prospective possibility that his car 
will collide with another tomorrow, or a living person having a death benefit policy, and 
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may descend into a free-for-all, causing a race to judgment or 
settlement.144  This problem is exacerbated if the cost of determining 
each claimant’s interest in the policy proceeds depletes the available 
moneys, as in the case of a “wasting” policy.145  Under a “wasting” 
policy, for every dollar paid to the officers and directors, one less dollar 
of coverage is available to the debtor-company’s estate.146
Extending the stay because of the presence of insurance, however, 
conflates issues of insurance coverage with the presence of a securities 
fraud claim.  Rather, the insured and insurer should resolve the question 
of coverage without enjoining the securities fraud claim.  The plaintiff-
investors pursue an action against the directors and officers, not against 
the insurer.14
 
7  Insurers may contest coverage, making the insurer’s 
involvement uncertain.  For example, insurers may invoke a policy 
provision for fraud exclusion,148 which excludes coverage for any loss 
resulting from any profit or advantage that the director or officer 
obtained by violating the securities laws.149  Similarly, insurers may 
dispute whether there is a covered “loss” as defined in the policy.  
Policies often define “loss” to mean damages, judgments, settlements, 
and defense costs.150
 
claiming his beneficiaries have a property interest in the proceeds even though he 
remains alive.”  In re Adelphia Commc’ns, Corp., 298 B.R. at 53-54. 
  If plaintiff-investors seek restitution or 
disgorgement, however, it is an open question whether the claim is a 
 144.  In re Metro. Mortg. & Sec. Co., Inc., 325 B.R. at 857. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  In re First Cent. Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. at 17. 
 147.  See In re Reliance Acceptance Grp., Inc., 235 B.R. at 557; see also Boles v. 
Turner (In re Envid, Inc.), 364 B.R. 139, 157 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (“The existence 
of D & O Policies, which are subject to the unliquidated, contingent claims of the Plan 
Trustees and the settled claims of the Shareholder Plaintiffs who have suffered a loss 
within the meaning of those policies, does not form the basis for extraordinary 
injunctive relief favoring the Plan Trustees over the Shareholder Plaintiffs and the D & 
O Defendants simply because the Plan Trustees happen to have obtain their status 
through confirmation of liquidating plans. While the amount of insurance proceeds 
available to the Plan Trustees will be reduced, that is not so extraordinary a 
circumstance as to warrant exercise of the Court’s limited, “related to” jurisdiction to 
enter an injunction under § 105(a) . . . The right of the parties to pursue the same assets 
and individuals is not, in and of itself, a cognizable theory in support of an injunction.”). 
 148.  GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 139. 
 149.  GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 140.  This includes gains from insider trading as 
well.  See Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 400 (D. Del. 2002). 
 150.  Michael J. Kaufman, Insurance, in 26A SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES § 
20:28 (2010). 
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covered “loss.”151  Additionally, insurers may threaten to rescind 
coverage on the basis of misrepresentation in the insurance 
application.152 A securities fraud suit’s effect on insurance is relevant 
only between the debtor-company, the officers and directors, and the 
insurers.153  The nature and amount of coverage is a matter to be 
resolved between the insurers and insured, without enjoining securities 
fraud plaintiffs from proceeding with their claim.154
Similarly, the policy does not provide defense funds as a matter of 
right because a securities fraud claim has been filed.  Defense funds are 
not property of the debtor until either agreement or a finding by a 
court.15
 
5  Even when an insurer pays for defense, it reserves its right to 
contest coverage.156
 
 151.  Kaufman, supra note 150.  Professor Kaufman goes on to note that this 
argument is plain wrong because Section 11 and Section 12 of the 1933 Act make clear 
that any recovery of damages is measured by and limited to the plaintiff’s losses, not 
the disgorgement of any profit to the defendants.  Id. 
  Thus, not only has the debtor-corporation’s interest 
 152.  As scholars Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith explain: 
Corporations typically submit a copy of their financial statements with their 
application for D&O insurance, and D&O insurance underwriters commonly use 
financial measures derived from the financial statements to price that insurance.  
Thus, fraud in the financial statements [often the basis for 10b-5 liability] can 
become fraud in the application for insurance, provided that the underwriter had 
insisted that the corporation provide an application that incorporated the financial 
statements and that the insurer can prove that the underwriter relied on the 
fraudulent information in the statements. 
Baker & Griffith, supra note 126, at 800. 
 153.  In re Reliance Acceptance Grp., Inc., 235 B.R. 548, 557 (D. Del. 1999) (“If the 
Shareholders are successful and obtain a judgment or judgments, coverage may be 
relevant as a practical matter, as certain of the defendants may not have the ability to 
pay any judgment.  The defendants may have claims against the Company and the 
insurers for indemnification.  It is at that time and in that context, an action among the 
Debtors, the officers and directors and the insurers, that this issue of the nature and 
extent of coverage would be resolved.”). 
 154.  Id.  
 155.  Maxwell v. Megliola (In re Marchfirst, Inc.), 288 B.R. 526, 530 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2002). 
 156.  ALLAN D. WINDT, Consent By Insured to Defense Offered Subject to a 
Reservation of Rights, in 1 INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 2:17 (5th ed. 2009); see 
also In re Marchfirst, Inc., 288 B.R. 526, 530 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002).  Many courts that 
have considered whether an insured can reject an insurer’s tendered defense with a 
reservation of rights have held that the insured has an absolute right to reject any 
defense offered subject to a reservation of rights.  E.g., City of Carter Lake v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1060 n.7 (8th Cir. 1979) (Iowa law); State ex rel. 
Rimco, Inc. v. Dowd, 858 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1993);.  The insurer 
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in the insurance proceeds not matured, but it may never do so.157
3. The Debtor-Company’s Reorganization Efforts 
  
Therefore, the presence of D&O insurance is insufficient to extend 
automatic stay protection to directors and officers. 
A key feature of Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings is that the 
debtor’s management retains control of the company while in 
bankruptcy.158  Based on this feature, management argues that the stay 
should be extended to bar securities fraud suits against them because 
their undivided attention is necessary to facilitate the debtor’s 
reorganization.159  Some courts have agreed, extending the automatic 
stay (or issuing an injunction) to protect non-debtors whose time and 
energy should not be diverted.160
 
must either (1) affirm the policy, defend the suit, and pay any resulting adverse 
judgment, regardless of the existence of any policy defenses; or (2) to refuse to defend 
and take its chances that its denial of coverage will stand up in a later suit on the policy, 
Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 288 (Alaska 1980). 
 
 157.  In re Marchfirst, Inc., 288 B.R. at 530. 
 158.  Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in 
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
125, 128 (1990).  When the debtor’s management retains exclusivity over presenting 
the plan of confirmation, this management wields considerable power: 
When exclusivity is maintained, the debtor corporation’s management drafts and 
proposes a plan of reorganization after consulting and negotiating with the key 
representatives of the creditors and sometimes the shareholders. Those 
representatives may include “official” committees appointed by the United States 
Trustee, unofficial committees organized by members of the affected group, or 
other representatives, such as indenture trustees or the attorneys for the plaintiffs in 
a class action. Whether or not the representatives agree to a proposed plan, 
management can force a vote of the affected creditors and shareholders. 
Id. at 128-29. 
 159.  See Gray v. Hirsch, 230 B.R. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The central purpose 
of extending the automatic stay is to suspend actions that pose a serious threat to the 
debtor-company’s reorganization efforts.  Gerard v. W.R. Grace & Co. (In re W.R. 
Grace & Co.), 115 F. App’x 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2004) (non-precedential disposition); 
JNA-1 Corp. v. Uni-Marts, LLC (In re Uni-Marts, LLC), 404 B.R. 767, 780-81 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2009). 
 160.  E.g., SALERNO, ET AL., supra note 112, at 105; see also Monarch Life Ins. Co. 
v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 979 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Uni-Marts, LLC 404 B.R. at 
782; In re K-Mart Corp., 285 B.R. 679, 689 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002); E. Airlines, Inc. v. 
Rolleston (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 111 B.R. 423, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); 
Supermercado Gamboa, Inc. v. Camara de Commerciantes Mayoristas De P.R., Inc. (In 
re Supermercado Gamboa), 68 B.R. 230, 233 (D. P.R. 1986); ProvinceTown Boston 
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Three problems with this argument exist, however.  First, whether a 
director or officer’s continued service is crucial to the debtor-company’s 
reorganization is a highly factual inquiry.161  If the direction of the 
debtor’s bankruptcy case is already established, extending the stay is 
inappropriate because the directors or officers are no longer needed to 
guide the company through the bankruptcy.162  Administration connotes 
planning, executive decision-making, and supervision of the bankruptcy 
estate,163
Second, the premise of the argument—that management should 
guide the company through bankruptcy—is flawed.  Behavioral analysis 
teaches that entrenched management may impede reorganization efforts.  
In the sphere of individual decision-making, people systematically 
overrate their abilities and contributions, resulting in excessive optimism 
and an inflated sense of ability to control events and risk.16
 and if no more planning, decision-making, or supervision is 
necessary, these officers and directors no longer need the protection of 
the automatic stay. 
4
 
Airline, Inc. v. Miller (In re ProvinceTown Boston Airline, Inc.), 52 B.R. 620, 625-26 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (recognizing that courts consider officers and directors vital to 
reorganization if they own assets that are used to fund the debtor’s reorganization or if 
they play a significant and meaningful role in preserving the debtor’s credit); Johns-
Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litig. Grp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 420, 426 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
  This bias 
Certain factors, though, may counsel against extending the stay.  For example, 
bankruptcy courts are reluctant to extend the stay if the management is exposed to one 
or a few suits that will not likely consume significant portions of management’s time.   
In re Uni-Marts, LLC, 404 B.R. at 782.   Bankruptcy courts are also hesitant to extend 
automatic stay protection if the securities fraud allegations focus on the personal 
misconduct of the officers and directors.  Morgan v. Korbin Sec. Inc., 649 F. Supp. 
1023, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 1986).  It is also significant if the debtor-company does not seek 
to extend the stay, or otherwise concedes that the parallel proceeding will not impair its 
reorganization efforts. See, e.g., In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 261 B.R. 534, 537 (S.D. Fla. 
2001). 
 161.  See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 43 B.R. 443, 461-62 (S.D. Ohio. 1984). In 
that hearing, the bankruptcy court should focus on the benefits that the debtor can 
demonstrate that it would obtain from the directors’ continued services, as opposed to 
the potential detriment the directors will experience.  Id. at 462. 
 162.  See In re Envid, Inc., 364 B.R. 139, 149-50 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007). 
 163.  Id. at 149. 
 164.  Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social 
Harms), in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMIS149 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); see 
also Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing 
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may distort judgment regarding the cause of the company’s bankruptcy: 
attributing the bankruptcy to an external circumstance outside of 
management’s control, rather than mismanagement. Moreover, once a 
person voluntarily commits to an idea or course of action, this person is 
beset with a strong motivation to resist evidence that the course was ill-
chosen.165
Third, in reality, current management of public companies is often 
ousted when the company files for bankruptcy.16
  Thus, management already set on a way of doing things—
possibly things that led to the company’s perilous financial situation to 
begin with—may disregard objective evidence that undermines their 
original course of action. 
6  Bankruptcy expert 
Lynn M. LoPucki debunks the idea that current officers and directors of 
bankrupt companies should shepherd a corporation through 
bankruptcy.167  Examining cases from 1990 through 2004, LoPucki 
concluded that when a member of pre-petition management remained as 
CEO through the crucial stages of the bankruptcy case, the company was 
more likely to fail in the five years after it emerged from bankruptcy.168  
Conversely, a company that hired a new CEO from outside the company 
was more likely to succeed in the five years after it emerged from 
bankruptcy.169
 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL . L. REV. 1051, 1091-93 
(2000). 
  Retaining management premised on the idea that they 
 165.  Langevoort, supra note 164, at 149, 151 (“Self-confidence and external image 
are threatened both by introducing a troubling awareness of the possibility of mistake, 
and by raising the need to consider a reversal of one’s position, which, in turn, calls into 
question one’s reputation for consistency, a highly valued asset in our economic culture. 
Cognitive-dissonance theory predicts that once a commitment is made, attitudes and 
beliefs will shift to preserve consistency.”); see also A. Mechele Dickerson, A 
Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 5-6 
(2003). The tendency to remain at the status quo is called the status quo bias. Daniel 
Kahneman, et. al, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo 
Bias, in CHOICE, VALUES, & FRAMES 159, 163 (Kahneman & Tversky eds., 2000). 
 166.  WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note87, at 445; see also LoPucki & 
Whitford, supra note 87, at 726 (finding that in large public company reorganizations, 
management changed in seventy percent of the cases). 
 167.  LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 143-45. 
 168.  LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 145. 
 169.  LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 145.  Because of these behavioral biases and the 
evidence that supports their validity, at least one scholar has suggested that directors 
should be under a duty to file a timely bankruptcy petition to encourage directors to 
consider the interests of all the company’s constituents, including workers, creditors, 
the community, and shareholders.   See generally Dickerson, supra 165.  But most of 
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are “vital” to the reorganization may impede reorganization efforts, and 
it sacrifices the claims of securities fraud victims. 
4. Res Judicata Concerns 
One of the most potent arguments directors and officers advance is 
that the stay should be extended because the securities fraud litigation 
may produce findings that would bind the debtor-company through res 
judicata or collateral estoppel.170  Collateral estoppel bars a party from 
re-litigating an issue determined against that party in an earlier action.171  
Some bankruptcy courts have been receptive to this argument and have 
recognized that this concern may warrant extending the automatic 
stay.172
 
the efforts aimed at eradicating the overconfidence bias have failed and no clear 
solution has yet presented itself that would counteract this bias.  Baruch Fischhoff, 
Debiasing, in DANIEL KAHNEMAN, ET AL, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES 432 (1982). 
  Indeed, it does weigh in favor of extending the automatic stay.  
However,  this is an “unusual” circumstance that is not present in every 
securities fraud case.  Moreover, it assumes the plaintiffs will sue the 
debtor-company.  Even still, allowing securities fraud claims to be 
determined by the federal district court is consistent with Congress’s 
intent that the federal district courts, not the bankruptcy courts, resolve 
 170.  See, e.g., In re Uni-Marts, LLC, 404 B.R. 767, 780-81 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); 
In re SN Liquidation, Inc., 388 B.R. 579, 585 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008); In re Am. Film 
Tech., Inc., 175 B.R. 847, 850-54 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994). 
 171.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (8th ed. 2004). The consequences of collateral 
estoppel can be dire for both defendants and plaintiffs: “[i]t can be invoked offensively . 
. . to preclude litigation of an issue that was decided favorably . . . in a prior action. Or, 
it can be used defensively . . . to preclude relitigation of an issue that was decided in his 
favor in a prior suit.” JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES & 
MATERIALS 1273 (10th ed. 2009). 
 172.   In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 111 B.R. 423, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re 
Am. Film Techs., Inc., 175 B.R. at 848; In re Johns Manville Corp., 40 B.R. 219, 225 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“[O]nce a witness has testified to a fact, or what sounds like a fact, 
that witness may be confronted with his prior testimony under oath in a future 
proceeding directly involving [the debtor], whether or not [the debtor] was a party to the 
record on which the initial testimony was taken. Once an admission against interest is 
made, under oath or otherwise, by the agent of a party, that admission stands for all 
time. No matter what [the plaintiffs] may stipulate, the thousands of other claimants and 
cross claimants who [may be] after [the debtor’s] assets, would be entitled to use the 
product of such discovery.”). 
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these claims.173
C. MAKING NON-DEBTOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS UNECONOMICAL 
 
Securities fraud actions against non-debtors face another barrier as 
a result of the company’s bankruptcy: increased costs.  As this Part 
shows, a company’s bankruptcy may make securities fraud actions 
against non-debtors uneconomical by imposing unnecessary and 
duplicative discovery costs on investor plaintiffs.174  Also, it may result 
in the denial of class certification outside of the bankruptcy court.175
1. Bankruptcy Materials and Heightened Pleading for Securities Fraud 
 
First, bankruptcy can duplicate discovery efforts for plaintiff-
investors.  Securities fraud actions already face considerable procedural 
barriers on a motion to dismiss,176 for class certification,177 and for 
summary judgment.178
 
 173.   See infra note 113 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress relegated 
securities fraud claims to the federal district court, not bankruptcy courts); see also 
supra note 246 and accompanying text (explaining that bankruptcy courts may not have 
jurisdiction to determine securities fraud liability in the first instance). 
  Specifically, under the PSLRA, Congress 
 174.  See supra Part III.C.1. 
 175.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 176.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., interpreted the PSLRA’s scienter 
requirement and has required a “mini-trial on the merits” at the 12(b)(6) stage absent 
any benefit of discovery. In re ProQuest Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 728, 747 (E.D. 
Mich. 2007). John M. Wunderlich, Amending Pleadings in Securities Fraud Litigation 
After Tellabs, 37 No. 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 360 (2009) (discussing the varied approaches to 
whether Rule 15’s liberal amendment policy perseveres in light of the PSLRA 
and Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.) 
 177.  E.g., Fener v. Operating Eng’rs. Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund, 579 
F.3d 401, 407-410 (5th Cir. 2009)  (holding that absent an event study that rules out 
other causes of a stock price decline, a court will deny class certification to the plaintiff 
class); In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 486 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(mandating that defendants be given an opportunity to rebut the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption at class certification); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, 
Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 270 (5th Cir. 2007) (requiring plaintiffs to establish loss causation 
by a preponderance of the evidence to use the fraud-on-the-market presumption of 
reliance at the class certification stage). 
 178.  In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496, F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (requiring 
a reliable event study to connect post-transaction stock movement to the defendant’s 
fraud and holding that absent an event study, a court will grant summary judgment for 
the defendant); see also Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The 
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enhanced the pleading standard, requiring that plaintiffs allege facts 
(including the defendant’s state of mind) with particularity.179  Congress 
also stayed discovery pending a motion to dismiss.180  This stay of 
discovery has forced plaintiffs to resort to other, less conventional 
means to meet the heightened requirement.181  Materials prepared in the 
context of a company’s bankruptcy—such as the bankruptcy petition, 
the bankruptcy docket and pleadings, transcripts from bankruptcy 
proceedings, a trustee’s complaint, or a bankruptcy examiner’s report—
may provide a wealth of information for plaintiffs’ attorneys.182  
Recognizing this, defendants in related securities fraud actions often 
object vigorously to a plaintiffs’ use of this information.183
 
Troubling Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 208-09 (2009) (arguing that an event study is now an essential 
element of 10b-5 liability). 
  This Part 
 179.   15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) ; see also Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
 180.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) . Even mandatory disclosures are put on hold until 
after the court rules on a motion to dismiss. Medhekar v. U.S. Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325, 
328-29 (9th Cir. 1996); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(C) . The discovery stay has two 
exceptions: (1) to preserve evidence; and (2) to prevent undue prejudice. Med. 
Imaging Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Lichtenstein, 917 F. Supp. 717, 720 (S.D. Cal.1996). An 
additional purpose of the discovery stay is that it slows the race to the courthouse door 
by forcing plaintiffs to conduct more extensive prefiling investigations. Michael A. 
Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
913, 929 (2003). 
 181.  See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Resolving the 
Continuing Controversy Regarding Confidential Informants in Private Securities 
Litigation, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 637 (2010) (discussing how securities 
plaintiffs often rely on confidential informants to satisfy the heightened pleading 
burden); Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Congress, the Supreme Court 
and the Proper Role of Confidential Informants in Securities Fraud Litigation, 36 No. 
2 SEC. REG. L.J. 345, 345-46 (2008) (same); Ethan D. Wohl, Confidential Informants in 
Private Litigation: Balancing Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure, XII FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 551, 555 (2007) (same). 
 182.  In re Stratosphere, Corp., Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1106 n.8 (D. Nev. 
1998); see also In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc., Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 221-22 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (transcript from bankruptcy proceedings); Cohen v. Nw. Growth Corp., 385 
F. Supp. 2d 935, 965-66 (D.S.D. 2005) (bankruptcy petition); Catholic Order of 
Foresters v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1160 (N.D. Iowa 
2004) (bankruptcy docket and pleadings).  The scope of examination in bankruptcy is 
much broader than discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  In re 
Recoton, Corp., 307 B.R. 751, 755 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).  
 183. See, e.g., In re New Century Trs. Holdings, Inc., 407 B.R. 558, 562-63 (Bankr. 
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shows that bankruptcy materials help plaintiff-investors meet their 
pleading and evidentiary burdens, but the courts may impede the use of 
these materials. 
Certain records in the debtor’s bankruptcy case—like statements 
made at bankruptcy hearings or a trustee’s complaint alleging fraud—
prove useful to securities fraud plaintiffs.184  Any party in interest in the 
debtor’s bankruptcy may request the appointment of a trustee,185 with 
power to avoid transfers, assume executory contracts, retain 
professionals, and even operate the debtor’s business.186  The trustee can 
also bring claims on behalf of the debtor’s estate.187  In In re Huffy, the 
plaintiff-investors brought a securities class action against Huffy 
Corporation and its executives for violating the securities laws by 
misrepresenting its acquisition of Gen-X, a rival manufacturer of 
sporting goods.188  On a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs asked the court 
to take judicial notice of the trustee’s complaint filed in Huffy’s 
bankruptcy, which alleged that the Huffy executives breached their 
fiduciary duty by paying nearly $2.7 million out of Huffy’s retirement 
plan to another executive without determining whether Huffy was 
solvent.189
 
D. Del. 2009); In re Recoton Corp., 307 B.R. at 754. 
  This allegation, the plaintiffs maintained, demonstrated the 
 184.  Cf. Jacobson v. AEG Capital Corp., 50 F.3d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir. 1995); see 
Charal Inv. Co., Inc. v. Rockefeller (In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc., Sec. Litig.), 311 
F.3d 198, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2002) (counsel’s statements made at bankruptcy hearing); 
SEC. v. Antar, 120 F. Supp. 2d 431 (D.N.J. 2000) (deposition testimony). 
 185.  11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (“At any time after the commencement of the case but 
before confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States 
trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of a trustee 
. . .”). 
 186.  11 U.S.C. §§ 544-550; 365; 327; 1108. 
 187.  Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 
1991) (“The Trustee stands in shoes of bankrupt corporation and has standing to bring 
any suit that corporation could have instituted had it not petitioned for 
bankruptcy.”); see also Smith v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 421 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the trustee could assert claims against Chapter 11 debtor’s former officers 
and directors, attorneys, auditors, and investment bankers for breach of fiduciary duty, 
breach of contract, and professional malpractice). 
 188. In re Huffy Corp. Sec. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974 (S.D. Ohio 
2008).  (plaintiffs claimed that the Gen-X acquisition was a “disaster,” because Gen X’s 
costs were not controlled, its inventory was in a state of disarray, its invoices had not 
been collected and its bills were unpaid). 
 189.  Id. at 979-80. 
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executive’s scienter (or motive) to misrepresent.190  The court took 
judicial notice of the trustee’s complaint for two reasons.191  First, the 
plaintiffs were only asking the court to take judicial notice of the 
allegations, not the truth of it, and on a motion to dismiss, as opposed to 
a motion for summary judgment, the court had to address only whether 
the allegations in the complaint stated a claim for relief, not whether 
sufficient evidence made the case.192  Second, the request for judicial 
notice was comparable to asking for leave to amend.193  Further, the 
court noted that taking judicial notice of the trustee’s complaint, rather 
than dismissing without prejudice and forcing the plaintiffs to file an 
amended complaint, would conserve judicial resources.194  Once the 
district court considered the trustee’s complaint, the plaintiffs were able 
to adequately allege scienter for one of the executives.195
Bankruptcy examiners have played major roles in investigating pre-
petition misconduct that led to the filing of some of the most notorious 




 190.  Id. at 981 (explaining that defendants argued the Court could not take judicial 
notice of the Trustee’s complaint, because it contained only allegations and not facts). 
  Under the 
 191.  Id. at 978-79. (“In determining whether to grant a Federal Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, district courts primarily consider the allegations in the complaint. The court is 
not limited to the four corners of the complaint, however. Numerous cases . . . have 
allowed consideration of matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, 
items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the 
record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is 
unquestioned; these items may be considered by the district judge without converting 
the motion into one for summary judgment.”  (citing 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1357 at 375-76)).   
 192.  In re Huffy Corp. Sec. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d at 978  (stating that on a motion 
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court ordinarily cannot consider matters outside of the 
pleading unless the court converts the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary 
judgment under Rule 56.);  See, e.g., Buck v. F.D.I.C., 75 F.3d 1285,1288 n.3 (8th Cir. 
1996). 
 193.  In re Huffy Corp. Sec. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (stating that leave to 
amend is freely given and that the PSLRA does not limit this.).  But the circuits are 
divided over whether Rule 15’s liberal amendment policy remains in tact in light of the 
PSLRA and Tellabs.  See Wunderlich, Amending Pleadings in Securities Fraud, supra 
note 176.  If the court takes a stringent view of Rule 15, judicial notice may not have 
been appropriate because amendment may not have been proper. 
 194.  In re Huffy Corp. Sec. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d at 981-82. 
 195.  Id. at 995. 
 196.  Clifford J. White III & Walter W. Theus, Jr., Chapter 11 Trustees and 
Examiners After BAPCPA, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 289, 321 (2006); see also Colin 
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Code, the bankruptcy court can (although rarely does197) appoint a 
bankruptcy examiner to investigate conduct and then file a report 
regarding that investigation.198  An examiner is usually appointed when 
the movant alleges securities fraud by the debtor and its management 
team.199  If a bankruptcy examiner is charged with investigating any fact 
pertaining to fraud or misconduct, his report is highly relevant to 
securities law violations.200  The examiner’s report can roadmap future 
litigation, but also put the brakes on meritless causes of action.201
 
Barr, $642 Million To clean up Lehman—and Counting, CNNMONEY.COM, (Mar. 12, 
2010), available at, http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/12/news/companies/lehman.fees. 
fortune/index.htm. 
  If a 
 197.  David J. Baldwin & R. Stephen McNeill, Considerations of Examiner 
Appointments in Bankruptcy Actions, 26 BANKR. STRATEGIST 1 (June 2009). 
 198.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104(c); 1106(a)-(b); In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. 
Schilling, 355 F.3d 415, 422, 429 (6th Cir. 2004).  The examiner’s report, once filed, is 
a public record.  11 U.S.C § 107(a) (“. . . a paper filed in a case under this title and the 
dockets of a bankruptcy court are public records and open to examination by an entity at 
reasonable times without charge . . .”). A bankruptcy court can, however, order the 
information sealed for commercial, confidential, or defamatory reasons.  In re 
Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 156 B.R. 414, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). An examiner may obtain 
documents and materials from the debtor-company, its directors, officers, and even its 
auditors, to name a few.  See, e.g., In re New Century Trs Holdings, Inc., 407 B.R. 558, 
562-63 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).  An examiner performs his duties at the request of the 
bankruptcy court, for the benefit of the debtor, its creditors, and shareholders. See, e.g., 
id. 
 199.  Baldwin & McNeill, supra note 197, at 1. 
 200.  See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA 
Litig.), No. MDL-1446, 2005 WL 3504860, at *10 n.19 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2005); In re 
SemGroup Energy Partners, L.P., Sec. Litig., No. 08-MD-1989-GKF-FJM, 2009 WL 
3713524, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 4, 2009).  In Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, the 
bankruptcy examiner reported that Lehman Brothers’ use of an accounting device, the 
“Repo105,” was used only for the purposes of balance sheet manipulation and that there 
would likely be a colorable claim against the senior officers that certified and oversaw 
the transactions involving this accounting device.  Introduction, Executive Summary, 
and Procedural Background, Report of Examiner in In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 
No. 08-13555 (JMP), at 5-8, 18-21 (Mar. 11, 2010), available at, http://lehmanreport. 
jenner.com/VOLUME%201.pdf; see also Final Report of Bankruptcy Examiner, Final 
Report of Examiner in In re New Century Trs Holdings, Inc., No. 07-10416 (KJC) (Feb. 
29, 2008), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/ 
Final_Report_New_Century.pdf (concluding that the debtor company engaged in a 
number of significant improper and imprudent practices related to its loan originations). 
 201.  White III & Theus, supra note 196, at 323.  This point should not be glossed 
over.  Securities fraud opponents are often concerned that much of securities litigation 
is frivolous.  This was a driving belief behind enactment of the PSLRA.  S. REP. NO. 
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securities fraud plaintiff may rely on a bankruptcy examiner’s report, the 
plaintiff can save significant time and money otherwise spent in 
duplicative discovery.202
Bankruptcy courts are mindful, however, that an examiner’s report 
should not “fuel the litigation fires of third party litigants.”20
 
3  This 
concern existed in the massive bankruptcy of Baldwin-United, which 
was alleged to have artificially inflated the value of its stock through 
misleading financial reports, statements, and press releases.204  Baldwin-
United eventually filed bankruptcy in 1983,205 which was, at the time, 
the largest bankruptcy in American history.206
 
104-98, at 5 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (“The Committee 
heard substantial testimony that today certain lawyers file frivolous “strike” suits 
alleging violations of the Federal Securities Laws in the hope that defendants will 
quickly settle to avoid the expense of litigation.”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) 
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (discussing the “abusive 
practices” employed in securities litigation).  Thus, allowing a bankruptcy examiner to 
screen out frivolous claims would best serve Congress’s intent behind the PSLRA and 
inhibit the filing of frivolous suits.  
  Three days after filing 
 202.  In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. 314,316 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (“[T]he 
Examiner’s file drawers offer a most enticing alternative to the long and bloody battles 
which plaintiffs’s counsel often face in the discovery phase of securities 
litigation.”); see also Colin Barr, $642 Million To clean up Lehman—and Counting, 
CNNMONEY.COM, (Mar. 12, 2010), available at,http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/12/ 
news/companies/lehman.fees.fortune/index.htm(“. . . the Lehman report cost less than 
half as much as the examiner reports for Enron—another large, complicated, high 
profile case—and was issued much sooner after Lehman’s bankruptcy filing. That could 
help plaintiffs seeking to recover Lehman losses.”). 
 203.  In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. at 316; In re New Century Trs Holdings, 
Inc., 407 B.R. at 566 (citing In Re Baldwin United Corp.); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., 
GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 39 
(2006). (stating that a bankruptcy examiner is in fact an advocate who seeks to frame 
the case for liability against those who might be induced to contribute to the bankrupt 
estate.) 
 204.  Stoller v. Baldwin United, No. C 1 82 1438, 1984 WL 884, at 885 (S.D. Ohio 
Sep. 19, 1984). 
 205.  Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database, available at, 
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/companyinfo.asp?name=Baldwin-United+Corporation (last 
visited, Sep. 16, 2009). 
 206.  Stoller v. Baldwin-United Corp., 41 B.R. 884, 886 (S.D. Ohio 1984). (“The 
balance sheets contemplated nearly ten billion dollars, and the case involved more than 
200 subsidiaries of the debtor corporations.”); Baldwin-United Corp. v. Paine Webber 
Group, Inc. (In re Baldwin-United Corp.), 57 B.R. 759, 769 (S.D. Ohio. 1985) (“There 
were over 8,000 claims filed representing well over 1000,000 peoples and entities.”). 
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for bankruptcy, multiple securities fraud suits were brought in various 
federal district courts207 but were stayed by Section 362 of the Code.208  
The bankruptcy court appointed an examiner to identify any fraud, 
dishonesty, or mismanagement in the affairs of the debtor-company.209  
The securities fraud plaintiffs moved to lift the stay to pursue their 
securities litigation, arguing that if they could not continue, they would 
lose valuable evidence.210  The district court denied the request even 
though the plaintiffs would have benefitted from the examiner’s 
report.211  In the bankruptcy court, the securities fraud plaintiffs then 
moved for an order requiring the court-appointed examiner to preserve 
documents and other investigative materials.212  The bankruptcy court, 
however, was wary that if examiners become “civil grand juries” 
(thereby losing their nonadversarial role), the subjects of their 
investigation would be hampered by the threat of litigation.213
Similarly, in the Enron debacle, the securities fraud plaintiffs 





 207.  See In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 765 F.2d at 344; In re Baldwin-United 
Corp., 57 B.R. at 762. 
  The district court found that the plaintiffs’ incorporation 
 208.  11 U.S.C. § 362. 
 209.  In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. 314 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985). 
 210.  Stoller, 41 B.R. at 884, 890. The bankruptcy court is not the only forum that 
determines third party discovery issues relating to the examiner. See In re Baldwin 
United Corp., 46 B.R. at 317. 
 211.  Stoller, 41 B.R. at 891 (“As to the potential for fading memory or misplaced 
records, the impact of that concern is blunted by the fact that the bankruptcy examiner 
will be conducting an investigation into whether fraud occurred in the recent corporate 
past of the debtors.  As already noted, the bankruptcy court, in denying these plaintiffs’ 
motion for relief from the § 362 stay, concluded that ‘[w]hile the scope of [the 
examiner’s] investigation may not precisely coincide with the thrust of the  . . . 
plaintiffs’ discovery, it would appear totally senseless for the plaintiffs to proceed with 
their monumental task until they have the benefit of [the examiner’s] efforts.’”). 
 212.  In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. at 314. The Bankruptcy court was 
concerned that the prospect of litigation surrounding the examiner’s investigation would 
chill compliance with the examiner’s efforts. Id. at 316. To assuage these concerns, the 
plaintiffs cleverly argued that they sought only the preservation of the evidence and not 
the use of it. Id. The bankruptcy court was unimpressed and stated that there was “little 
doubt that they will at some point seek to require the Examiner to turn over some or all 
of the documents and other information which he has obtained through his 
investigation.” Id. 
 213.  Id. at 317. 
 214.  Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.), 
No. MDL-1446, 2005 WL 3504860, at *11 n.20 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2005). 
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of the report was proper and as a result, the plaintiffs were able to 
overcome a motion to dismiss.215  Relying on an examiner’s report to 
muster a securities fraud claim does present some risk, however.  
LoPucki aptly describes this danger within the context of Enron, where 
the plaintiffs incorporated the entire examiner’s report in their 
complaint216
Enron and the other parties who wished to sue on Enron’s behalf had 
only two years in which to file their cases or be barred by the statute 
of limitations.  Because the case was handled so awkwardly, nearly 
six months passed before the examiner was even appointed.  The 
effect was to rush the investigation.  The examiner worked quickly 
but was still completing his report when the deadline expired.  That 
left parties who discovered their causes of action through the 
examiner’s work little or no time in which to digest the 4,500-page 
report, retain counsel, and prepare their lawsuits for filing.21
: 
7
If the bankruptcy case is handled poorly, securities fraud plaintiffs 
may not be able to wait for the examiner’s report.  Additionally, 
LoPucki warns that the bankruptcy examiner may—as in the case of 
Enron—work against class action plaintiffs and destroy documents that 
these investors seek because, for one reason or another, the examiner 




 215.  Id.  at *11, 13-14.  The court supported its conclusion by referring to Rule 
10(c) which allows a party to incorporate any instrument as an exhibit to a pleading.  
Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c) (“A statement in a pleading may be adopted by 
reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion. A copy of 
a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all 
purposes.”). 
 
 216.  In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 2005 WL 3504860, at *11 
n.20. 
 217.  LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 151. 
 218.  Id. at 148; cf. Colin Barr, $642 Million To Clean Up Lehman—and Counting, 
CNNMONEY.COM, (Mar. 12, 2010), available at, 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/12/news/companies/lehman.fees.fortune/index.htm (“At 
the same time, the Lehman report cost less than half as much as the examiner reports for 
Enron—another large, complicated, high profile case—and was issued much sooner 
after Lehman’s bankruptcy filing. That could help plaintiffs seeking to recover Lehman 
losses. ’The Lehman case is much like the Enron case. . . People were waiting for the 
examiner report in the Enron case, and it ended up serving as the basis for lots of civil 
suits.’ The promptness of the [examiner’s report in Lehman’s bankruptcy] will give the 
many aggrieved parties in the Lehman case ample time to pursue claims against the 
company’s officers, business partners and others . . . The statute of limitations for 
416 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
Moreover, the bankruptcy courts may place limits on the use of 
bankruptcy materials in securities fraud litigation.219  For example, in In 
re Recoton, the committee of unsecured creditors moved the bankruptcy 
court to authorize subpoenas for the production of documents and to 
examine witnesses.220  The directors of the debtor-company (the persons 
from whom discovery was sought) objected because securities fraud 
suits were pending against them in federal district court.221  The 
directors argued that an examination in bankruptcy would deny them the 
benefit of the PSLRA’s stay of discovery provision.222  The district court 
rejected the defendants’ PSLRA argument, however because the PSLRA 
only applies to suits that have in fact begun and provides for a 
mandatory stay of discovery in actions brought only under the federal 
securities laws.223  Thus, the district court ordered the examination under 
Bankruptcy Rule 2004,224
The investigation that a debtor or creditors committee may . . . be an 
essential element in the formulation of a Chapter 11 plan or in a 
Chapter 7 trustee’s ability to make any distribution to creditors.  It 
would seriously delay and disrupt the administration of bankruptcy 
cases if the happenstance of a pending securities action gave the 
defendants in that suit the ability to impede investigations that the 
 stating: 
 
claims filed by a bankruptcy trustee is two years, which means many Lehman cases will 
have to be filed in the next six months.”). 
 219.   See In re Recoton, Corp., 307 B.R. 751, 759 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 220.  Id. at 754. The committee is expressly authorized to investigate the acts, 
conduct, assets, liabilities and financial condition of the debtor under § 1103 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2) (stating that a committee appointed under 
Section 1102 may “investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial 
condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business and the desirability of the 
continuance of such business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the 
formulation of a plan.”). 
 221.  In re Recoton, Corp., 307 B.R. at 755. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. at 757-58. 
 224.  The relevant portions of Bankruptcy Rule 2004 states: 
(a) Examination on motion. 
On motion of any party in interest, the court may order the examination of any 
entity. 
(b) Scope of examination. 
The examination of an entity . . . may relate only to the acts, conduct, or property 
or to the liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which 
may affect the administration of the debtor’s estate, or to the debtor’s right to a 
discharge. . . . 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(a)-(b). 
2011] BANKRUPTCY’S PROTECTION FOR NON-DEBTORS 417 
FROM SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION 
 
debtor or committee may appropriately conduct . . .225
Yet, the court only permitted the examination because the court 
received assurances from the committee that any discovery would be 
subject to a protective order “prohibiting its use for any purpose 
whatsoever other than in connection with this bankruptcy proceeding 




Prohibiting the use of discovered material relevant to fraud 
unjustifiably duplicates discovery costs for plaintiffs.  Allowing 
plaintiffs access to materials can simplify suits, decrease costs for both 
parties, and most important, expose corporate fraud. 
 
2. Denying Class Certification in  
Non-Debtor Actions in Non-Debtor Forums 
A company’s bankruptcy may even influence a district court’s 
decision to certify a securities class action against a non-debtor.  In 
Gregory v. Finova Capital, the high-water mark for bankruptcy’s 
protection of non-debtors from securities fraud, the Fourth Circuit held 
that the district court abused its discretion when it certified a class action 
against a non-debtor. 
In Gregory, noteholders of the Thaxton Group, Inc. (“TGI”) filed a 
class action against TGI’s lender, Finova Capital Corporation 
(“Finova”).227  TGI sold the notes in a series of person-to-person 
transactions and under eight separate registration statements filed with 
the SEC.228  According to the plaintiffs, Finova worked with TGI to put 
together a group of companies that were insolvent by about $40 million 
and that TGI was doomed to fail from its inception.229  TGI, which was 
started by Finova, had no net profits, and could only stay in business by 
raising money from a larger and larger group of investors, similar to a 
Ponzi scheme.230
 
 225.  In re Recoton, Corp., 307 B.R. at 759. 
  The day after the plaintiffs filed suit against Finova, 
 226.  Id. at 756; see also In re Mittco, Inc., 44 B.R. 35, 35 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984) 
(limiting Rule 2004 discovery when it is designed to abuse or harass). 
 227.  Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d 188, 189 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 4, Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d 
188 (4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2118). 
 230.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 6, Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d 
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TGI filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.231  The noteholders alleged that 
TGI misrepresented financial data in the notes’ registration 
statements.232  They also alleged that Finova was jointly and severally 
liable for the misrepresentations as a controlling person under Section 15 
of the 1933 Act,233 which provides for joint and several liability on 
behalf of controlling persons.234  The noteholders sought to certify a 
class action against Finova in federal district court.235
Meanwhile, after the noteholders filed their class action, the 
committee of TGI’s unsecured creditors brought an adversary 
proceeding against Finova, in TGI’s bankruptcy, to either disallow or 
subordinate Finova’s claims to the noteholders’ claims because Finova 
violated the securities laws.23
 
6  After these events in the bankruptcy 
court, the district court certified the noteholders as a class.237
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s class certification 
decision, finding that the district court abused its discretion by certifying 
 
 
188 (4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2118). A “Ponzi scheme,” or “pyramid scheme,” is a 
fraudulent investment scheme in which money contributed by investors is used directly 
to repay or pay interest to earlier investors. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
 231.  Gregory, 442 F.3d at 189. 
 232.  The Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (“In case any part of the 
registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an untrue statement 
of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or 
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such 
security (unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth 
or omission) may ...sue... every person who signed the registration statement...”). 
 233.  Gregory, 442 F.3d at 189.  Section 15 of the 1933 Act and Section 20(a) of the 
1934 Act both impose liability on controlling persons, but they differ slightly in 
language.  Section 15 appears to provide a complete defense for ignorance while 
Section 20(a) requires a showing of good faith.  COFFEE, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION, 
supra note 63, at 1078-79.  Courts are still wrestling with what this difference in 
language means though. 
 234.  The Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o. According to the plaintiffs, 
Finova was an active partner and counselor to TGI, took a leading role in most of TGI’s 
major business decisions, and was fully aware of the note-sale program designed to 
transfer the risky portion of Finova debt to the unsuspecting noteholders.  Gregory, 442 
F.3d at 189. 
 235.  Gregory, 442 F.3d at 189. 
 236.  Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 510(c). 
 237.  Gregory, 442 F.3d at 190.  To certify a class, a plaintiff must satisfy the 
numerosity, commonality, adequacy, and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a).  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(a).  In addition, for actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3) seeking monetary 
damages, the class issues must predominate over individual issues and the class action 
device must be a superior method of adjudication.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B). 
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the class.  It reasoned that the district court failed to analyze whether the 
class action was superior to the adversary proceeding pending in the 
bankruptcy court to adjudicate the noteholders’ claims.238  The court 
reasoned that it would be “inefficient and needlessly duplicative” and 
that the adversary proceeding would make the same findings regarding 
Finova’s conduct.239  Additionally, the court observed that if the 
noteholders were made more or less whole by success in the adversary 
proceeding—success would result in payment from TGI’s assets ahead 
of Finova — Finova’s direct liability to the noteholders would be more 
or less extinguished.240
Gregory wrongly reversed the district court, however.  First, the 
Fourth Circuit ignored the highly deferential standard governing the 




 238.  Gregory, 442 F.3d at 190-91.  A district court’s decision to certify a class is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138 (4th 
Cir. 2001); McClain v. S.C. Nat’l Bank, 105 F.3d 898, 902 (4th Cir. 1997). 
  Here, 
there was no abuse of the district court’s discretion when it certified a 
securities class action consisting of noteholders of the debtor proceeding 
against a lender of the debtor (non-debtor vs. non-debtor) over the 
objection of—not the debtor—but creditors of the debtor (non-debtor vs. 
non-debtor, with non-debtors objecting).  Second, the adversary 
bankruptcy proceeding concerned only whether Finova must wait behind 
the noteholders in line for TGI’s assets, and it would not resolve whether 
 239.  Gregory, 442 F.3d at 191 n.5. 
 240.  Id.; see the Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (providing for joint 
and several liability for violations of Section 11 of the 1933 Act). 
 241.  The abuse of discretion standard requires a reviewing court to show enough 
deference to a decision maker’s judgment that the court does not reverse merely 
because it would have come to a different result in the first instance.  See Henry J. 
Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J.747, 754 (1982) (“[T]he trial 
judge has discretion in those cases where his ruling will not be reversed simply because 
an appellate court disagrees.”); see also Monroe v. City of Charlotesville, Va., 579 F.3d 
380, 384 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that a decision to deny or grant class certification is 
accorded “great” deference); Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 161 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(noting that an appellate court reviews a decision to certify a class under the “highly 
deferential” abuse of discretion standard); In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 
1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005) (same).  What’s more, when reviewing a grant of class certification, 
as in Gregory, appellate courts accord the district court noticeably more deference than 
when reviewing a denial of class certification. E.g., In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. 
Sec. Litig., 574 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 
544 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir. 2008); Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
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Finova was directly liable to the noteholders.242  Whether the 
noteholders’ direct claims against Finova will be extinguished by the 
adversary bankruptcy proceeding was speculative because: (1) it was 
uncertain whether the creditors committee would prevail; and (2) even if 
they did prevail, the Code provides only that the bankruptcy court 
“may,” and not “must,” equitably subordinate the claims.243  Further, the 
plaintiffs were not even parties to the adversary proceeding in 
bankruptcy.244
Third, a bankruptcy court may lack authority to determine securities 
fraud liability in the first instance.24
 
5  The bankruptcy courts disagree 
over whether they have the authority to determine liability between the 
debtor-company and the securities fraud claimant.246
 
 242.  Gregory, 442 F.3d at 194-95 (King, J., dissenting). 
  If this authority is 
questionable (debtor vs. non-debtor), then a bankruptcy court’s authority 
to determine liability for securities fraud between a securities fraud 
claimant and a non-debtor (non-debtor vs. non-debtor), is even less 
 243.  Id. at 194 n.3. 
244  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 60, Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d 188 
(4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2118). 
 245.  In this case, it would also be questionable whether the bankruptcy court had 
subject matter jurisdiction as well.  Bankruptcy courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction.  E.g., In re Querner, 7 F.3d 1199, 1201 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Granger 
Garage, Inc., 921 F.2d 74, 77 (6th Cir. 1990).  Bankruptcy courts have only derivative 
jurisdiction; “They do not operate under an exclusive grant of jurisdiction as in § 
1471(c) but rather derive their jurisdiction from the district courts.”  White Motor Corp. 
v. Citibank, N.A., 704 F.2d 254, 263 (6th Cir.1983).  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334, a district 
court has exclusive jurisdiction of all bankruptcy cases under title 11 and “original but 
not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or 
related to cases under title 11.”  28 U.S.C. § 1334(b); see also id. § 157(b) (authorizing 
district courts to refer “core” and “related to” proceedings to bankruptcy courts for 
adjudication).  Jurisdiction over proceedings between third parties which have an effect 
on the bankruptcy estate flow from the court’s “related to” jurisdiction.  Id. § 1334(b).  
It is a considerable stretch that this non-debtor action against other non-debtors, to 
which only non-debtors are objecting, is related to the bankruptcy estate, particularly 
when recovery would not involve any of the debtor’s interests. 
 246.  Compare In re Jafari, 401 B.R. 494, 495 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009) (stating a 
bankruptcy court lacks authority under Section 523(a)(19) to adjudicate liability as 
opposed to dischargeability); cf In re Zimmerman, 341 B.R. 77, 80 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
2006); In re Demers, No.  08 00616 FLK7, 2009 WL 3681675, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. 
Wash. Oct. 30, 2009) (concluding that bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to determine 
liability under Section 523(a)(19)); with In re Chan, 355 B.R. 494, 501 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2006) (concluding a bankruptcy court has authority to determine both liability and 
dischargeability); see also In re Litchman, 388 B.R. 396, 409 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008). 
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clear.247  As discussed, not all courts are receptive to class proofs of 
claim.248  Judge King observed the practical problem this would present 
in Gregory: each TGI noteholder—approximately 4,000 of them—
would have to file a separate lawsuit to preserve his claim against 
Finova.249  The burden of bringing multiple, individual adversary 
proceedings or a single proceeding with multiple parties would be 
enormous.250  Last, Gregory encourages gamesmanship and increases 
litigation costs.  In the district court, Finova argued that the bankruptcy 
court was the proper forum, but in the bankruptcy court, Finova argued 
that the district court should resolve the case.251
 
 247.  See In re Refco Inc., 505 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Bankruptcy court is a 
forum where creditors and debtors can settle their disputes with each other. Any internal 
dispute between a creditor and that creditor’s investors belongs elsewhere.”). 
  Finova—the party that 
engineered TGI’s bankruptcy to begin with—argued it both ways and 
won. 
 248.  In re Standard Metals Corp., 817 F.2d at 632 (denying class proof of claim); 
In re Amdura Corp., 130 B.R. 575 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (same); In re Texaco Inc., 81 
B.R. 820 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same). 
 249.  Gregory, 442 F.3d at 194.  For example, in Drexel Burnham’s bankruptcy, 
“the magnitude and complexity of 850 securities-related proofs of claim, which totaled 
more than $20 billion, was viewed as an almost impossible bar to achieving a 
reorganization.  The barrier was overcome by the creation of a no-opt-out class, whose 
representatives negotiated a settlement with the Drexel debtors.”  Leonard H. Gerson, 
Another Look at Treatment and Use of Class Proofs of Claim and Class Actions in 
Bankruptcy, 27 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 16 (2008). 
 250.  Consider Drexel Burnham’s case—the debtor would have to bring 850 
individual adversary proceedings or file one adversary proceeding with 850 parties.  
This places considerable strain on the debtor-company, the other parties, and the 
judicial system.  This burden can be reduced by bringing a single adversary proceeding 
and a single class proof of claim.  Gerson, supra note 249, at 16. 
 251.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 58-59, Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 
F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2118). 
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D. THE PLAN OF REORGANIZATION: JURISDICTION AND POWER TO 
RELEASE NON-DEBTOR’S FROM SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY252
The courts have not been nearly as subtle as the previous Parts 
suggest in releasing non-debtors from liability in bankruptcy.  Courts 
outright release non-debtors in the debtor’s plan of reorganization.  In 
exchange for surrendering all assets over to the bankruptcy court’s 
jurisdiction, the debtor receives a discharge from pre-petition debt, quid 
pro quo.25
 
3  This discharge benefits only the debtor; it does not apply to 
guarantors, co-defendants, employees, or related companies—and 
therefore, creditors are free to collect from these co-liable parties.254
Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts have used their general, equitable 
powers under the Code to extinguish claims against non-debtors.25
 
5  
Recently, in Travelers Indemnity v. Bailey, the Supreme Court held that 
bankruptcy courts have subject matter jurisdiction to discharge claims 
against non-debtors in the debtor’s plan of reorganization if the claims256
 
 252.  David A. Skeel, Jr., suggests that trial lawyers have been supportive, rather 
than critical, of bankruptcy’s role in mass tort resolution and that this support reflects 
the comparative attractions of bankruptcy as opposed to bringing class action litigation 
outside of bankruptcy.  SKEEL, JR., supra note 9, at 220.  This may be especially true for 
securities litigation, where, in recent years, the federal courts have made the standards 
for class certification more rigorous.  See generally Michael J. Kaufman & John M. 
Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class Certification Merits Trials in 
Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 323 (2010). 
 
 253.  E.g., In re Mosby, 244 B.R. 79, 85 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000) (quoting In re 
Jeffrey, 176 B.R. 4, 6 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994)) (“A chapter 7 case involves a quid pro 
quo: debtors receive a discharge and, in exchange, make full disclosure about their 
financial affairs, especially their assets, and surrender their nonexempt assets to the 
trustee for liquidation and distribution among creditors. . . . Having received a 
discharge, they cannot now ignore their obligation to surrender their assets for the 
benefit of creditors.”); In re O’Shaughnessy, 252 B.R. 722, 735 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) 
(“Complete and full disclosure is the quid pro quo for the substantial benefits obtained 
by the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) which is subsumed by the discharge 
provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1141 in a Chapter 11 case.”). 
 254.  11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (applying only to the debtor). 
 255.  Joshua M. Silverstein, Hiding in Plain View: A Neglected Supreme Court 
Decision Resolves the Debate Over Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 
Reorganizations, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 16-17 (2006).  “For at least eighteen 
years, the federal courts have been divided over whether such releases are permissible.”  
Id. at 17. 
 256.  “[T]he expanded definition of claim (together with the Code’s elimination of 
any requirement that a debtor be insolvent when it files for bankruptcy) has played a 
crucial role in some of the most visible bankruptcy cases of the past two decades, the 
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relate to the property of the bankruptcy estate.257  Travelers, though, 
leaves much to be desired, as it does not address whether bankruptcy 
courts have the power—as opposed to jurisdiction258—to release these 
non-debtors.  To determine whether a bankruptcy court has the power to 
discharge non-debtor liabilities in a plan of reorganization, the majority 
of the circuits adopt a flexible approach, assessing the propriety of the 
injunction and release of a non-debtor on a case by case basis.259
 
‘mass tort cases—bankruptcies filed by Johns Manville, A.H. Robins, Dow Corning, 
and other firms after they were sued by thousands of actual and potential tort victims.”  
SKEEL, JR., supra note 9, at 217. 
  
 257.  Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009).  Professor Joshua M. 
Silverstein argues that a much earlier decision, United States v. Energy Resources, Co., 
495 U.S. 545 (1990), resolved the debate and concludes that bankruptcy courts have the 
power to issue non-debtor releases, but only in narrow circumstances.  
Silverstein, supra note 255, at 19-20.  This decision was not relied on in Travelers.  
See 129 S. Ct. 2195. 
 258.  “Subject matter jurisdiction and power are separate prerequisites to the court’s 
capacity to act.  Subject matter jurisdiction is the court’s authority to entertain an action 
between the parties before it.  Power under section 105 is the scope and forms of relief 
the court may order in an action in which it has jurisdiction.”  Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. 
Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1989).  
Jurisdiction over proceedings between third parties which have an effect on the 
bankruptcy estate flow from the court’s “related to” jurisdiction.  28 U.S.C. § 
1334(b) (“Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and notwithstanding any Act of 
Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district 
courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil 
proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.”).  
 259.  See, e.g., SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992); Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In 
re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989); Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale 
Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 760-61 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Munford Inc., 97 F.3d 449, 455 (11th 
Cir. 1996); In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1986). ”[N]on-
debtor releases are receiving ’growing judicial acceptance’ and becoming increasingly 
common in Chapter 11 plans of reorganization.  Indeed, one commentator has 
suggested that ’the practice of approving non-debtor releases is more widespread than 
the number of published judicial opinions would suggest[,]’because appellate 
challenges to plan reorganization are often mooted by consummation of the plan.”  
Silverstein, supra note 255, at 18 (citing Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and 
Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 
Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 959, 964 n.15 (1997)).  Professor Silverstein 
notes that the debate is split four ways, rather than two: one group of pro-release courts 
that assert the equitable powers of the Code allow for non-debtor releases; a group of 
anti-release courts that assert that non-debtor releases violate Section 524; a second 
group of anti-release courts that contend that Section 524 does not prohibit non-debtor 
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Considerations analyzed by these courts include: (1) whether the case 
involves a mass tort claim;260 (2) whether the claim is direct rather than 
derivative;261 (3) whether there was a consensual release;262 (4) whether 
the claimants were in some way compensated for the release under the 
plan;263 (5) whether the release is integral for the debtor to settle with 
other creditors;264 and (6) whether the plan contains a channeling 
injunction.265  The courts that have adopted this flexible approach—the 
infamous mass tort bankruptcies: In re A.H. Robins (intrauterine Dalkon 
Shield device), In re Johns-Manville (asbestos), In re Drexel Burnham 
(securities fraud), In re Dow Corning (silicone breast implants)—were 
all bankruptcies that involved thousands of actual and potential tort 
victims266
Even still, a few circuits are reluctant to extend the release to non-
 similar to  securities class actions. 
 
releases, but the bankruptcy policies underlying it do; and another group of anti-release 
courts that argue that Section 524 does not constitute a bar, but the equitable provisions 
in the Code simply do not grant enough power to release non-debtors.  Id. at 17.  
Because non-debtor releases are not the main focus of this article, I will generalize and 
discuss two approaches: the pro-release courts, and the anti-release courts. 
 260.  In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 9 (N.D. Okla. 1998); see also In re A.H. 
Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 743-45 (E.D. Va. 1988) (observing that thousands of tort 
actions forced A.H. Robins into bankruptcy); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In 
re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 640, 649 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that thousands 
of asbestos actions pushed Johns Manville into bankruptcy); In re Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Group, Inc., 130 B.R. 910, 918-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that the 
bankruptcy involved tens of thousands of securities fraud claimants). 
 261.  In re Zenith Elec. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 111 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999); In 
re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 506 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997). 
 262.  See In re Specialty Equip. Co., 3 F.3d 1043, 1049 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that 
consensual agreement is relevant).  Consensual non-debtor releases are generally 
permissible under the Code because they do not primarily involve the bankruptcy 
court’s power.  See In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. at 506.  Rather, the validity of 
a consensual release is a question of contract law and courts recognize that they are no 
different from any other settlement or contract.  See id.. 
 263.  In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d at 293; In re AOV 
Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d at 1154. 
 264.  In re Munford Inc., 97 F.3d 449, 455 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 265.  Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 760 (5th Cir. 1995).  A 
channeling injunction is a provision in the debtor’s plan of reorganization that enables a 
court to enjoin all future suits against the debtor or its insurer.  Susan N.K. Gummow & 
John M. Wunderlich, Suing the Debtor: Examining Post-Discharge Suits Against the 
Debtor, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495, 525-26 (2009).  Instead, these suits are “channeled” to 
certain proceeds already set aside.  Id. 
 266.  SKEEL, JR., supra note 9, at 217. 
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debtors.267  This minority concludes that the debtor-company cannot, as 
part of its plan of reorganization, release non-debtors, such as the 
directors or officers, from shareholders’ claims.268  These courts strike 
these provisions on their own, even if the plaintiffs do not object.269  
Consider In re Continental Airlines, in which the plaintiffs brought 
securities fraud class actions against Continental’s directors and officers, 
alleging that they violated the securities laws.270  After these suits were 
filed, Continental filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.271  The 
bankruptcy court stayed the plaintiffs’ class action against the directors 
and officers and Continental later filed its plan of reorganization, which 
released and enjoined the plaintiff-investors’ class action against 
Continental’s directors and officers, who themselves were not in 
bankruptcy.  The bankruptcy court approved the plan over the plaintiffs’ 
objections.272
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, stating that the Code 
explicitly authorizes the release and permanent injunction of claims 
against non-debtors in only one instance: resolving asbestos claims.27
 
3  
Other than that, the court stated, the Code clarifies that a discharge does 
not relieve non-debtors of their liabilities.274
 
 267.  See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 167 B.R. 776, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); In 
re Mkt. Square Inn, Inc., 163 B.R. 64, 66-67 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994). 
  Even though Section 
105(a) grants the bankruptcy courts power to issue any necessary order 
to carry out the Code, the court continued, Section 105 is limited in 
 268.  See Gillman v. Cont’l Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 205 (3d 
Cir. 2000); Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The bankruptcy 
court has no power to discharge the liabilities of a nondebtor pursuant to the consent of 
creditors as part of a reorganization plan.”); Landsing Diversified Properties-II v. First 
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 601 
(10th Cir. 1990); see also In re Original IFPC S’holders, Inc., 317 B.R. 738, 746-48 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004); In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. at 500, 504-06; In re 
Future Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 485-86 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988). 
 269.  See In re Davis Broad., Inc., 176 B.R. 290, 292 (M.D. Ga. 1994). 
 270.  In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d at 205. 
 271.  Id. The plaintiffs did not name the debtor-company in their securities fraud 
class action suits, but they did file a class proof of claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy.  Id. 
at 205 n.1. 
 272.  Id. at 206-07. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s approval of 
the plan.  Id. at 208. 
 273.  Id. at 211; 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). 
 274.  In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d at 211. 
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scope and cannot create rights that are otherwise unavailable.275  The 
Third Circuit then held that the blanket release and injunction was not 
permissible, even under the most liberal read of Section 105.276
Whether a bankruptcy court can enjoin future actions against non-
debtors in a plan of reorganization presents a recurring question of 
jurisdiction and bankruptcy court power.  The Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Travelers Indemnity Company v. Bailey involved a state law 
claim for fraud against the debtor’s insurer.  The case sheds some light 
on when a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction (though not power) to 
enjoin other actions (such as securities actions) against non-debtors (like 
an officer or director).27
 
7  In Travelers, the bankruptcy court approved 
settlement agreements that provided that when the settling (non-debtor) 
insurer paid funds to a designated trust, all persons would be 
permanently enjoined from bringing or continuing any suit against the 
(non-debtor) insurer.278  Ten years later, the plaintiffs brought suit 
against the insurer for fraud, and the bankruptcy court enjoined the 
action.279
The Supreme Court concluded that the bankruptcy court had 
subject-matter jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own prior order so 




 275.  Id.  “One of the most commonly employed canons is expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, which dictates that the express inclusion of one thing signals the 
exclusion of all other things. This rule is one individuals use all of the time in everyday 
life, just without such formal articulation.  In the ‘no dogs in the park’ example, the 
commonsense logic of the expressio unius canon is what leads the average person to the 
conclusion that ‘no dogs’ does not apply to cats.”  Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 542, 559 (2009). 
  Thus, Travelers 
 276.  In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d at 214; see also Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 
1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (overturning bankruptcy court’s approval of plan of 
reorganization that released directors and officers from liability for securities law 
violations). 
 277.  Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009). 
 278.  Id. at 2199-2200. 
 279.  Id. at 2200. 
 280.  Id. at 2205; see also Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91 (D. Mass. 
Aug. 14, 2009) (“[I]n the context of the enforceability of a Bankruptcy Court order 
releasing an insurer from any claims “based upon, arising out of or relating to” certain 
insurance policies, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the phrase ‘relating to.’”); 
Cano v. GMAC Mortg Corp. (In re Cano), 410 B.R. 506, 546 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) 
(“In Travelers Indemnity, the Supreme Court held that, post-discharge, a bankruptcy 
court has jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own orders even though the bankruptcy 
case was closed and the claims would not affect the bankruptcy estate.”).  However the 
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suggests that a bankruptcy court may entertain the prospect of enjoining 
suits against non-debtor directors and officers on the presence of D&O 
insurance alone.  The connection between directors and officers, the 
bankruptcy estate, and D&O insurance is much closer than the 
attenuated relationship in Travelers, which involved state law claims for 
fraud against the insurer that happened to insure the debtor. 
Much of Travelers, however, was devoted to cabining the decision.  
The Court stated that the holding was narrow and did not resolve 
whether a bankruptcy court has the power to enjoin claims against non-
debtors that are not derivative of the debtor’s wrongdoing.281  The 
Court’s suggestion that the bankruptcy court could enjoin these claims 
had explicit textual support in the Code, as Section 524(g)(4)(A) deals 
specifically with asbestos claims.282  Moreover, the dissenting justices 
argued that bankruptcy courts have the power to enjoin claims against 
non-debtors only if the non-debtors seek recovery from the bankruptcy 
estate.283
What is most troubling about a non-debtor release—in effect, a 
non-debtor discharge—is that it is broader than the discharge these non-





Supreme Court did note that at some point the term “relate to” loses any meaning 
because “everything is related to everything else.” Travelers Indem. Co., 129 S. Ct. at 
2203-04 (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 
335 (1997)). 
  Debts obtained by false pretenses, false 
representation, or actual fraud (other than a statement respecting the 
 281.  Travelers Indem. Co. 129 S. Ct. at 2207. 
 282.  Id. at 2207; see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). 
 283.  Travelers Indem. Co., 129 S. Ct. at 2207-08, 2210 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A 
bankruptcy court has no authority . . . to adjudicate, settle, or enjoin claims against 
nondebtors that do not affect the debtor’s estate.”). 
 284.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a).  To except a debt from discharge, the claimant must file a 
discharge complaint in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007. 
Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) provides as a general rule that a complaint to determine the 
dischargeability of a debt under  section 523(c) must be filed no later than 60 days after 
the first date set for the meeting of creditors.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c).  Section 
523(a)(19) however is governed by Rule 4007(b).  FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(b).  Rule 
4007(b) contains no limit for complaints filed under Section 523(a)(19).  FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 4007(b).  The heightened pleading provisions applicable to securities fraud 
claims also apply to motions to except a debt from discharge if it is based on securities 
fraud.  Guerriero v. Kilroy (In re Kilroy), 354 B.R. 476, 488-89 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
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debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition) are nondischargeable.285  
Section 523(a)(19) of the Code also states that any debt for the violation 
of any federal or state securities law, or common-law fraud in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security is nondischargeable.286  
Granting non-debtors releases for claims that they themselves could not 
obtain by filing for bankruptcy is inconsistent with the Code.287
 
 285.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). To except from discharge a debt under Section 
523(a)(2)(A), the creditor must show justifiable reliance.  Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 
68, 74-75 (1995). Securities fraud plaintiffs can either present direct evidence of their 
actual reliance or they can invoke a presumption of reliance.  In Stoneridge Investment 
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, the Supreme Court noted that a rebuttable presumption of 
reliance exists in two instances: (1) if there is an omission of a material fact by one with 
a duty to disclose; and (2) if the statement at issue becomes public, thereby falling 
under the fraud-on-the-market presumption. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc. 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008) (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 
406 U.S. 128 (1972) (presuming fraud where there is an omission and a duty to 
disclose) and Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (presuming fraud under the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption)).  The bankruptcy courts have not yet addressed 
whether a securities fraud plaintiff can invoke one of the reliance presumptions in a 
Section 523(a)(2)(A) discharge complaint, but if the basis of securities fraud liability is 
“controlling person” liability, then the Code’s discharge exception under Section 
523(a)(2)(A) does not apply.  Hoffend v. Villa (In re Villa), 261 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th 
Cir. 2001); Owen v. Miller (In re Miller), 276 F.3d 424, 429 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 
 286.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19).  For a debt to be nondischargeable under Section 
523(a)(19): (1) the debt must be for a violation of federal or state securities laws, or 
common-law fraud, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; and (2) the 
debt results from a judgment, order, decree, or settlement. Frost v. Civiello (In re 
Civiello), 348 B.R. 459, 464 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006).  Section 523(a)(19) applies to 
corporate executives and even individual brokers.  Kelli A. Alces, Moving Toward a 
Federal Law of Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 621, 630 
(2007).  It encompasses statutory securities violations and common-law fraud in 
securities transactions. Smith v. Gibbons (In re Gibbons), 289 B.R. 588, 592 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2003). Section 523(a)(19) was enacted to amend the Code to make 
nondischargeable judgments and settlements arising from state and federal securities 
law violations challenged by state or federal regulators, as well as by private parties. S. 
REP. NO. 107-146, at 11 (2002); see also In re Weilein, 319 B.R. 175, 179 (Bankr. N.D. 
Iowa 2004); In re McClung, 304 B.R. 419, 424 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2004). 
 287.  This principle is well-settled. E.g., Scrivner v. Mashburn (In re Scrivner), 535 
F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008) (“We have repeatedly emphasized . . that a 
bankruptcy court may not exercise its broad equitable powers under § 105(a) in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the other, more specific provisions of the Code.”) 
(internal quotations omitted); In re Nat’l Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc., 492 F.3d 
297, 302 n.4 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The Bankruptcy Code, of course, provides parameters 
within which courts must exercise their equitable powers in administering an estate.”); 
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IV. BANKRUPTCY’S PROBLEMATIC REMEDY FOR SECURITIES FRAUD 
Thus far, this Article has shown that bankruptcy can impede 
investor recovery for fraud, even outside of the bankruptcy context, from 
non-debtors.  This Part now turns to the Code’s proposed remedy—the 
trustee—and shows why the trustee is not always adequate.  First, 
trustees encounter problems of standing when pursuing claims for 
securities fraud.  Even if the trustee circumvents standing by using 
securities fraud as a basis for voiding a transaction, rather than 
proceeding directly on an action for securities fraud, the trustee cannot 
pursue damages.288  Even still, a trustee would likely encounter 
considerable trouble recovering insurance proceeds, the principal 
funding for securities fraud violations.289
A. STANDING PROBLEMS AND INADEQUATE RESCISSORY REMEDIES 
 
A trustee is an independent person that takes control of the bankrupt 
company.290  The trustee employs investigators that work from inside—
demanding discovery without resorting to the court, accessing the 
company’s files without restrictions, and requiring disclosure from the 
company’s attorneys without the protection of the attorney-client 
privilege.291  The Code mandates the appointment of a trustee in cases of 
fraud.292
 
Sherman v. Harbin (In re Harbin), 486 F.3d 510, 521 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he 
bankruptcy court may exercise its equitable discretion to develop an appropriate 
remedy, provided, of course, that the chosen remedy is consistent with the provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code.”); Vill. of Rosemont v. Jaffe, 482 F.3d 926, 935 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“Instead, the equitable discretion conferred upon the bankruptcy court by section 
105(a) is limited and cannot be used in a manner inconsistent with the commands of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”); Noonan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. (In re Ludlow Hosp. 
Soc., Inc.), 124 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The bankruptcy court may not utilize 
section 105(a) if another, more particularized Code provision ... impedes the requested 
exercise of equitable power.”); Smith v. Omni Mfg., Inc. (In re Smith), 21 F.3d 660, 
666 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Bankruptcy courts cannot use their equity power under Section 
105(a) ... to negate substantive rights or remedies that are available” under the Code.”). 
 
 288.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 289.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 290.  LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 11. 
 291.  LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 11-12. 
 292. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (“At any time after the commencement of the case but 
before confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States 
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Under the Code, the trustee can pursue claims on behalf of the 
debtor’s estate, including claims the debtor-company may have against 
its officers and directors or other entities for securities fraud.293  
However, standing under the securities laws still presents a problem.  
Only a purchaser or seller of stock can sue for securities fraud under § 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.294  The trustee is neither a purchaser nor a seller 
of securities.  Although a trustee can bring suit as the issuer (or seller) of 
the stock,295
 
trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of a 
trustee—(1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross 
mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or 
after the commencement of the case, or similar cause, but not including the number of 
holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor . . . 
“). Surprisingly in Enron, the bankruptcy court did not appoint a trustee even though the 
Code gave the court discretionary authority to appoint a trustee in Chapter 11 
proceedings in cases of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross management at the 
time.  LOPUCKI, supra note 65, at 12; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).  Section 1104 of 
This mandate was Congress’s response to Enron’s bankruptcy in which the bankruptcy 
judge delayed a hearing on motions for the appointment of a trustee until a deal was 
brokered that left most of Enron’s management in place and “[a]s a result, the 
investigators remained on the outside for the duration of the Enron case.”  LOPUCKI, 
supra note 65, at 14.  To remedy the failure to appoint a trustee in Enron, Congress 
ordered that the United States Trustee must move for the appointment of a trustee if 
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that those currently in control of the business 
participated in actual fraud, dishonesty, or criminal conduct as they managed the debtor.  
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 87, at 443.  There is a quid pro quo here too 
though: while the appointment of a trustee removes those suspected of fraud from the 
reins of the corporation, it puts the trustee at the helm, who, no doubt, is less capable of 
running the business. Id. at 444. 
 this recovery inures for the benefit of the corporation and its 
 293.  11 U.S.C. § 323(b). 
 294.  Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975). 
 295.  In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ““ERISA’’ Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 
797 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Profilet v. Cambridge Fin. Corp., 231 B.R. 373, 378 (S.D. Fla. 
1999); Estate of Soler v. Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir.1995) (“It is now 
well-established that a corporation has a claim under § 10(b) if the corporation was 
defrauded in respect to the sale of its own securities by some or even all of its 
directors.”); In re Stat-Tech Sec. Litig., 905 F. Supp. 1416, 1423 (D. Colo. 1995) 
(holding that corporation emerging from bankruptcy has standing under 10b-5 because 
“it is ‘well established’ that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 protect corporations as well as 
persons. Thus a corporation that issues its own stock in reliance on another’s deceptive 
or manipulative practice may be deemed a ‘seller’ with standing to sue under § 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.”) (citing Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 
404 U.S. 6 (1971)); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 200-03 (5th 
Cir. 1960),. 
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creditors. The individual purchasers do not benefit—their claims are 
subordinated in bankruptcy.296  The trustee has no standing to assert 
claims for damages on behalf of the defrauded purchasers of 
securities.297
Standing can be avoided for purchasers of securities, though, if the 
trustee uses the violation of the securities laws, not as an action for 
securities fraud, but as a basis for setting aside certain transactions.  
Specifically, the Code gives a trustee the power to avoid fraudulent 
transfers.29
 
8  If a transaction violates the federal securities laws, it may 
be basis for avoiding the transaction.299  In In re Fink, the Chapter 7 
debtor’s trustee filed an adversary complaint against a securities 
brokerage firm to recover certain payments.300  The debtor, a securities 
salesman with a brokerage firm, arranged for bridge financing for 
Renaissance Golf Products’ initial public offering.301  The National 
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), however, objected to the 
IPO, finding the compensation for participants, including the brokerage 
firm, excessive.302  To accommodate the NASD and keep its 
compensation deal intact, the debtor had a third party assign a portion of 
the stock it would receive to the debtor for the benefit of the brokerage 
firm.303
 
 296.  11 U.S.C. §§ 510(b), 1141(d). 
  Renaissance made no mention of this deal in its revised 
 297.  E.g., In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 390, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); 
Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir.1995); Bloor v. Carro, 
Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 62 n.4 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Fuzion 
Tech. Group, Inc., 332 B.R. 225, 237 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005); Wolkowitz v. Soll, 
Rowe, Price, Raffel & Browne, Inc. (In re Fink), 217 B.R. 614, 622 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1997). 
 298.  11 U.S.C. § 548. The Code gives a trustee the power to avoid a variety of 
kinds of pre-petition transactions. Such transactions include preferential payments to 
creditors (§ 547), fraudulent transfers (§ 548), the fixing of statutory liens (§ 545), and 
setoffs (§ 553). In addition, the Code gives a trustee the same avoiding powers that a 
creditor has under state law (§ 544(b)). 
 299.  See In re Fink, 217 B.R. at 618. 
 300.  Id. at 617-18. 
 301.  Id. at 617. 
 302.  Id.   (“The NASD is authorized . . . to act as a self regulatory organization for 
all brokers and dealers of securities that are traded over the counter. [The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78s.]  Because the Renaissance securities 
were to be traded over the counter, rather than upon a national securities exchange, the 
NASD had the authority, subject to the regulation and oversight of the SEC, to ensure 
that the IPO was in compliance with NASD and SEC rules.”). 
 303.  In re Fink, 217 B.R. at 617. 
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prospectus.304  After the IPO was completed, the third party transferred 
the stock to the debtor, and the debtor in turn transferred the stock to the 
brokerage firm.305  Ten months later, the debtor filed for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy and the trustee sought to void the sale and intercept the 
debtor’s payment to the brokerage firm.306  After concluding that the 
transfer violated the securities laws, and thus was illegal, the court 
avoided the transfer.307  The bankruptcy court emphasized that only a 
purchaser or seller of securities could sue for violating § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5. Further, here, the trustee’s claim was not brought under these 
securities laws, but only premised on them to argue that the transaction 
was illegal, and therefore could not impose a valid, legal obligation.308  
This provides less than full recovery for plaintiff-investors. The trustee’s 
avoidance power is equivalent to rescission or rescissory damages.309  
Yet, securities fraud victims can also obtain consequential or actual 
damages in addition to rescissory damages.310
B. EXCLUSIONS FROM INSURANCE COVERAGE 
  The trustee cannot seek 
these consequential damages. 
The trustee remains an imperfect remedy for securities fraud for an 
additional reason: A securities fraud judgment or settlement is usually 
funded by insurance.311
 
 304.  Id. at 618. 
  Insurance, an untapped source of funding, is 
 305.  Id. 
 306.  Id. 
 307.  Id. at 623. 
 308. Id. at 622 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 
(1975)). 
 309.  Rescission and rescissory damages are available for claims under both Section 
11 and Section 12 of the 1933 Act and under both § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 
10b-5.  COFFEE, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 63, at 1117-18. Rescissory 
damages measure the difference between the plaintiff’s purchase price and the 
plaintiff’s resale price, plus interest, and less any dividends or other corporate 
distributions with interest that the plaintiff received. Id. at 1117. 
 310.  Id. at 1130-32; see also Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei Chuan Inv., 189 F.3d 
1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 1999); Grubb v. Fed. Deposit Ins., Corp., 868 F.2d 1151, 1165 
(10th Cir. 1989); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg., Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 803 (2d Cir. 1973); 
James v. Meinke, 778 F.2d 200, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 311.  Baker & Griffith, supra note 126, at 761 (“[T]he vast majority of securities 
claims settle within or just above the limits of the defendant corporation’s D&O 
coverage.”).  But see, Bernard Black, et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 1055, 1057 (2006) (in both Enron and Worldcom—both mega-frauds and mega-
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even more important as the company is in bankruptcy and its managers’ 
personal wealth is often tied to the performance of the company.312  
However, a trustee, suing on behalf of the company, may be prohibited 
from recovering under these insurance policies because of the “insured 
vs. insured” exclusion, which provides that the insurer shall not be liable 
to pay for loss in connection with a claim made against an insured that is 
brought by any insured or by the company.313  This exclusion protects 
the insurer from collusive suits between insureds, i.e., the company and 
its officers and directors.314  This is a real concern as insurance fraud is 
the second most common white collar crime in the United States (the 
first is tax evasion).315  Some securities litigation scholars have found 
evidence that plaintiffs and defendants collude to pressure the insurer to 
settle on terms that may not reflect the merits of the claim.316
 
bankruptcies—the companies’ directors personally paid millions as part of settlement). 
 
 312.  Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Status of Defrauded Securityholders in Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1, 45 (1983). Coverage under a D&O policy includes a 
claim brought by the corporation against one of its officers.  Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. 
Segalla, Directors and Officers: Application to Actions Involving Corporation, or Other 
Officers and Directors, in 9A COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 131:32 (2009). 
 313.  GUMMOW, supra note 128 at 142; Susan N.K. Gummow & David P. Bart, 
Director and Officer Liability Insurance: How Bankruptcy Transforms the Rights of the 
Various Parties, 14 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101, 113 (2005). Traditionally, the “insured 
vs. insured” exclusion was employed to deny coverage for actions by a director, officer, 
or the named company against other directors or officers.  Coverage is not limited to 
third-party claims; it includes a claim brought by the corporation against one of its 
officers.  Russ & Segalla, supra note 128.  Some policies contain an exception to the 
“insured vs. insured” exclusion for persons appointed by a bankruptcy court to act on 
behalf of the bankrupt insured.  See Kelley v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re HA 2003, Inc.), 310 
B.R. 710, 716-17 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 314.  In re Buckeye Countrymark, Inc., 251 B.R. 835, 840-41 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
2000). 
 315.  Diane L. Polscer & Brett W. Sommermeyer, Fraud, Concealment, and 
Misrepresentation, in LAW & PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION § 2:15 
(2009). 
 316.  Baker & Griffith, supra note 126, at 756; John C. Coffee Jr., Reforming The 
Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1534, 1585 (“To the extent that contemporary securities litigation imposes its 
costs almost exclusively on the corporation and its insurers, this system benefits three 
sets of actors  corporate insiders, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and insurance companies—but 
not shareholders. Viewed in this way, the plaintiff’s attorney is less a champion of 
shareholders and more a participant in a process by which the parties shift liabilities 
created by corporate managers onto shareholders through the medium of costly 
insurance paid for by shareholders.  Because the repeat players  managers, attorneys, 
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Thus, whether claims asserted by a trustee against the debtor-
company’s directors and officers are excluded from coverage under the 
“insured vs. insured” exclusion is a recurring question.  Although a 
trustee is treated the same as any other plaintiff with no greater or lesser 
rights to insurance proceeds,317 the “insured vs. insured” question arises 
because the trustee stands in the shoes of the insured, the company 
itself.318  Some courts have recognized this tension and have held that 
the “insured vs. insured” exclusion does not apply because a claim by 
the trustee is made on behalf of the creditors, and not the debtor.319  In 
this case, the trustee is adverse to the directors and officers.320
 
  A 
trustee’s ability to recover insurance proceeds for securities fraud is 
nevertheless premised on a trustee’s ability to sue for fraud to begin 
with, and, as the preceding section showed, the trustee lacks standing on 
behalf of plaintiff-investors. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The aftermath of the financial crisis will focus attention on the 
judiciary as it addresses the overlapping bankruptcies and allegations of 
securities fraud.  This Article illustrates that bankruptcy can provide 
significant protection from securities fraud litigation.  However, 
investors—the victims of fraud—are further victimized when the 
company’s fraud forces it to file bankruptcy and they are denied 
recovery against those that do not file for bankruptcy.  The securities 
laws provide for expansive liability to deter fraud on the market and 
promote recovery from liable parties.  A company’s bankruptcy though, 
for reasons unsupported by the Code or the securities laws, deters 
investors from even adjudicating the liability of non-debtors (those that 
never consent to the quid pro quo of bankruptcy).  In the coming wave 
of regulatory reform, Congress must consider this overlap and set the 
 
and insurers  all benefit from this system, it remains stable, and the outcome is usually 
the same: settlement. . . Often, the result is litigation that is, to a degree, feigned.”). 
 317.  In re Jones, 179 B.R. 450, 455 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995). 
 318.  LaCroix, supra note 9, at 4. 
 319.  GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 143; see also Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. 
Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 404  (D. Del. 2002); Rigby v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s 
London, 907 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. App. Ct. 2005) (applying Florida law); In 
re County Seat Stores, Inc., 280 B.R. 319, 326 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 320.  GUMMOW, supra note 128, at 143. 
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course to promote investor recovery. 
 
